Serin. CXX. as dtfeover'd ay Nature and iy Revelation. r f5 ciple which we call theSoul, (till remains and lives feparate from it, that is, there is (till a part ofus which is free from the fateof the Body, and continues to per- form all thofe Operations, to the performance of which the Organs of the Body are not neceffary ; that is, when our Bodies are deftirute of Life, and become a dead Carcafe, there is (till fomething that did belong to us, which retains the Power of Underftanding, which thinks, and reafons, and remembers, and does all thefe freely. Thirdly, That be that goes about to prove the Soul's Immortality, fuppofeth the Exiftence of a Deity, that there is a God. For altho there be a very intimate and ftrift connexionbetween thefe two Principles as to us, as being the two great Pillarsofall Religion ; yet that which is firft and moft fundamental to all Religi- on, is the Exiftence ofa God; which if it benot firft proved, the belt Arguments for the Soul's Immortality lofe their force. Therefore as to the prefent Argu- ment, I fuppofe the Being of God as a thing acknowledged, and not now to be proved; which I may the better do, having formerly endeavour'd to make good this grand Principle of Religion, againft the Pretenfiónsof the Atheifis. Fourthly, The Exifience of a God being fuppofed, this doth very much facili- tate the other, of theSoul's Immortality. For this being an effential lxroperty of the Divine Nature, that he is a Spirit, that is, fomething that is not Matter ; it being oncegranted that God is, thus much is gained, that there is fp'ch a thing as a Spirit, asan immaterial Subftance, that is nit liable to die or perifh ; fo that he that goes about to prove the Immortality of the Soul, (hall not need to prove that theremay be fuch a thing as a Spirit, that the notionof an immaterial Sub- fiance does not imply a Contradi &ion ; becaufe, fuppofing that there is a God, who is effentially a Spirit, there can be no doubt of the Poffibilityof fuck a thing as a Spirit; and tho therebe this differencebetween God and all other Spirits, that he is an infinite Spirit, whereas others are but finite; yet noMan that grants the Exiftence of an infinite Spirit, canwith any pretenceor colour ofReafon deny the póffìbilityof afinite Spirit. Fifthly, and laflly, It is highly reafonable that Men fhould acquiefce and mil fatisfied in fuch Reafons andArgumentsfor the Proofof any thing, as the nature of the thing to be proved will bear ; becaufe there are feveral kinds and degrees of Evidence, which all things arenot equally capable of. It is fufficient that the Evidence be fuck as the Natureof the thing tobe proved will admit of, and filch as prudent Men make no fcruple to admit for fufcient Evidence for things of the like nature, and fuck as, fuppofing the thing tobe, we cannot ordinarily expect better or greater Evidence for it. There are two kinds of Evidence, which are the higheft and moft fatisfaûory that this World affords tous, and thofe are the EvidenceofSenfe, and Mathema- tical Demonftration. Now there are many things, concerning which the genera- lity of Men profefs themfelves tobe well fatisfied, which do not afford either of thefe kindsof Evidence. There's none of us but do firmly believe that we were born, tho we do not remember any fuch thing; no Man's Memory does furnifh him with the Te(timony of his Senfes for this matter, norcan anyManprove this by a Mathematical Demonliration, nor by any neceffary Argument, fo as to(hew it impoffible that thething fhould be otherwife. For it is poffible that aMan may come into the World otherwife, than by the ordinary courfe ofGeneration, as the firft Man did, who was created immediately by God; and yet I know noMan in the World who doubts in the lealt concerning this matter, tho' he have noo- ther Argument for it, but the Tehimony of others, and his own Obfervation, how other Perfons like himfelf came into the World. And 'tis reafonable to ac- quiefce in thisEvidence, becaufe the Nature of the thing affords nogreater. We who never were at yerufalem, do firmly believe that there is fuch a place, upon the Te(timony and Relation of others: and no Man is blamed for this, as being over-credulous ; becaufe no Man, that will not take the pains to go thither, can have any other greater Evidenceof it, than the general Teftimony of thofe who fay they have kenit. And indeed almoft all HumanAffairs, I am fore the moil important, are governed and conducted by fuch Evidence, as falls very much fhortboth of the EvidenceofSenfe, and of Mathematical Demonftration, Q2 To
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