Tillotson - BX5037 T451 1712 v2

3o Qt the Immortalityof the Soml, Vo1.Ir, deletíant, nec ut alienisintereft fedfuss. The Soul of Man hath this Argument of its Di- vine Original, that it is foftrangety delighted, fo infinitely pleafed and fatisfied with the Contemplation of Divine thingi, and is taken upwith thefe thoughts, as if they were its proper bufinefs and concernment. Thofe ftrong inclinations and defires after Immorta- lity, and the pleafure which goodMen find in the fore-thoughts of the Happinefs which they hope to enter into, when their Souls shall quit thefe Maniions ; the rditlefs afpirings of our Souls towards God, and thofe bleffed Maniions where he dwells, and where the Spiritsof goodMenconverfe withhim and one another, thefe fignifie our. Souls to be of a nobler extra&ion than the.Earth, that they are defcend- ed from above, and that Heaven is their Country, their thoughts are fo much upon it, and they are fo defirous to return to it. I (hall conclude this Argument fromthe noble and excellent Operations ofourSouls, ofwhich we are confcious to our (elves, with aPaffage of Tully to this purpofe. A- nimarum nttlla in terris origo inveniri potefl: nihil enim eft in animis mixam atque con- cretum ant quad ex tercet natum atquefiitum efe videatur. The Souls:of Men have not their Original from the Earth, it is in vain to feels for it there : for there is nothing in the mind of Man ofa material mixture and compofition, which we can imagine to beborn or formed out of the Earth. For, fays he, among material and earthly things there is no- thing, quad vimmemorie, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quad &praterita teneat, PJ" future provideat, & completli pofit prefentia. There's noearthly thing which hath the power of Memory, ofUnderflandtng, of Thought, which retains things pall, forefees andprov4es for thingsfuture, comprehends andconfiders things prefent. Singularis eft igitur quedam natura atque vis animi, fejunlia ab his uftatis notifque natures; fo that the Nature and Power of the Soul are (lapeculiar andfngularkind, different from all thofe natures which weare acquainted within thisWorld. He concludes, Itaquequicquid eft quad fentit, quad fapit, quad vult, quod viget, caalefle divinum eft, ob eamque rem sternumft necef ell. Therefore whatever that it which is endowed with a power ofPerception, with Wifdom, with Liberty, with fo much Vigour and Altivity as the Soul ofMan, is ofHeavenly and Divine Original, andfar that reafon is neceffarily Immortal, and to continue for ever. Thus I have reprefented to you as briefly and plainly as I could, thofe which I account the chief and ftrongeft Arguments of this great Principle of Religion, the Soul'sImmortality. Some ofthemare plain and obvious toevery Capacity; the reft,tho theybe above common Capacitìes,yet werenot tobenegfe &ed,becaufe they may be ufe- ful to fome, tho not toall ; and as thofe who are more wife and knowing fhould have patience, whin} themoftcommon and plaineft thingsare fpoken for the iuflru&ionof ordinary Capacities, fo thofe of lower Capacities fhould hecontent that many things fhould be fpoken which may be ufeful to others, tho they be above their reach. To fum up then what has been Paid from Reafon, for the proof of the Soul's Im- mortality. It is a natural Didtate andNotion of our Minds, univerfally entertained in all Ages and placesof the World, exceptingCome very fewPerfons and Se&s; it doth not,contradi&any other Principle that Nature hath planted in us, but doth very well agree with thofe other Notions which are molt natural ; it is molt futable to the natural Hopes and Fears ofMen; itevidently tends to the Happinefs and Perfe&ion ofMan, and to the good Ordet and Governmentof theWorld; la(tty, it gives the faireft account of the Phenomena of human Nature, of thole feveral A&ions and Operations whichwe are con fciousto our felves of. Now fuppofingthe Soul were Immórtal, what greater rational Evidence than this can we expe& for it? How can we without a Revelation have more affuranceof the thingsof this Nature, thanthefe Arguments giveus, not taken fingly, butas they con- cur together to make up an entire Argument, and to giveus fufficient Evidence of this? I do not fay that thefeArgumentsdo foneceffarily conclude it, that there is an ab- folute impoffibility the thing Gould be otherwife : but fo as to render it fufiìciently certain to a prudent and confiderate Man, and one that is willing to acceprof reafona- bleEvidence. For the generality of the Papifisdopertinacioufly maintain this unrea- fouable Principle, that therecan be no certainty of any thing without Infallibility : yet fomeof the wifer of them have thought better of it, and are pleafed to (late the bufinefs ofcertainty otherwife; particularly Melchior Cantis, oneof the molt Learned of their Writers determines thole things to be fufficiently certain, which no Man can withoutimprudence and obMinacy disbelieve. Certaspudhomilies eajrnt que negarifine pervicaciá f ultitiit nonpofunt. Men efteem thefe things certain, which noMan that is not unreafonably obstinate and imprudent candeny. And I think the Arguments olhave

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