SECTION II. 5 nature, or natural obligations, consideringnature both as sensible and rational. There seems also an eternal fitness or unfitness of things in thesocial life. It is fit that rational, social beings should make one another easy and happy, and preserve each other's life and peace; and it seems unfit that any of them shouldmake their neighbours uneasy or unhappy, or that they should destroy them*. It is fit therefore that social beings should keep their contracts, should do justice to all around them, should not rob or steal one another's property ; and that they should love each other, and do good, and be grateful to their benefactors. This is properly called 'r social virtue." All these seem to be rules derived from the very nature of things ; that is, supposing such rational, and sensible, and social beings to exist, they are di- rected by the eternal reason of things to behave withjustice and goodness towards each other. These rules seem to carry an obligation with them by the light of reasón. Note, by the word " obligation" in this place, we cannot mean any authoritative or suasive influence from the will, or law, or authority of a supe- rior ; since we are speaking of the eternal fitness of these things, without any consideration of the being of a God. Obligation, in this place therefore, can mean nothing but the mere reasonable fitness of our doing or not doing suchor such a thing in social life; or that this is the dictate of our reasoning powers. If there be aGod, an universal Maker and supreme Lord of all, there are eternal truths andfitnesses which relate to him- self, viz. that he mast always act according to the perfections of his nature, as a single, self-existent and supreme being. That he is not always bound by the same rules which bind social beings orfellow-creatures ; for he is not bound to do all the good he can, or to hinder all the evil he can. Again; that God can- not alienate luis own right to any thing, to give it irrevocably to a creature, but by his own express promise ; and therefore his gifts, without an absolute promise, are but loans, resumable at plea- sure. That he cannot originally make a creature sinful or misera- ble. That he has a right to the obedience of his creatures. That he cannotcommand his creatures to do any thing unfit to be done. That he will be just and true to all his creatures ; and that he will not finally deal alike with the righteous and the wicked. There is therefore a reward for the righteous, &c. I mention all these here, though they are not all necessary to my present subject ; yet itis good to keep them much in our view, in order tojustify God in many parts ofhis divine conduct. * These expressions are general indeed, and must include some limitation ; but the reason and nature of things gives this plain limitation to them, viz. When men have not forfeited their life, or their ease, by criminal actions, they are to be treated well by their fellow-beings, a3
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=