Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.3

SECTION V. II virtue, from the righteous Governor of the world. And he may look upon himself as most powerfully obliged to practise such social virtue and self- denial by the will and authority of that God who can 'and will reward. him. And thus the strict rule of social virtue, built on the reason and fitness ofthings, will :lot clash with the 'other rule ofreason, which is also built on the fitness of things, via. that a rational and sensible being should still pursue self- preservation and self- felicitation. The very supposition of a righteous God, who coin- wands strict virtue, and will reward it in a future state, takes away the seeming contradiction that otherwise might lie between these two rules of reason, and reconciles them. It is the glory of religion to reconcile these contrarieties, Now let ussurvey the opposite case : SECT. V.These Contradictions Irreconcileable without an Existent God. Upon supposition that men spring up into beingby fate or . chance, and that there is no Almighty Creator, or righteous Go- vernor, or Rewarder ;, then reason would dictate to us self-pre- servation, or, at least, self-felicitation in the present state, as our supreme obligation, and our supreme rule of action, notwithstand- ing all our remonstrances of single or social virtue ; since there is no hope of any possible compensation in any future' state for pre- sent acts of self-denial : And thus the strongest obligation would be turned on theside of preserving our present life, or at least our ease or .happiness ; nature and inclination, and self-love,.would' so determine it : and they appear also to have reason, and the fitness of things on their side. Thence it will appear, as to the practice of single or personal virtue, that Philedon has not suffi- cient obligation to tie himself to the rules of it under his violent appetites to sensuality, if there be no God : But self -felicitation would direct and lead him to all manner of indu lgence of plea- sure, and to finish 'his own life and being when his pleasures ended. His reason would tell him that this was the fittest thing he could do ; and I might prove it also mathematically : Thus, Suppose Philedon spent his life according to the rules of virtue, with much fatigue, and watchfulness and self-denial, he might die quickly, and his being, and all hope of felicity are soon at an end, and that for ever. Or if he dragged on life thus painfully toold age, still, at his death, his being and hope ofhappiness are for ever gone. And what good hath his virtue done him ? But, on the other hand, if he pursue pleasure with daily appetite and relish, and die in a few years time, he bath a much larger quantity of happiness than a short, or a long life of strict virtue, and constant laborious self-denial could give a man

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