Temptations to Evil, not from God. i z the conflitution, which importeth a power S E R M, of doing evil, and by which it is that we I. are rendered capable of it. This, as well as `--`'"'" the other capacities of our nature, is derived from God ; but there is no rational pretence for alledging that gift to be a temptation, becaufe liberty is not an inclination to evil, but meerly the mind's power of determin- ing itfelf to that, or the contrary, according as the motives to the one or the other íhould appear flrongefl ; and that the author of the conflitution hath cart the ballance on the fide of virtue, we may fee from what hath been already faid, fnce he hath given us virtuous inflints, with a fenfe of moral obligations, and added a very powerful fanc- tion to them. Befides, liberty is abfolutely neceffary to the pra Lice of virtue, as well as to the being of moral evil ; nór could we without it have been capable of rational happinefs. It muff be confeffed that our {late is itnperfeél ; we are made frail and mutable creatures, liable to temptations, and many are actually miffed by them ; nor have we any pretence for denying that it was agreeable to the divine perfeft goodnefs and wifdom, to create fuch a fpecies of be- ings, and in fuch a condition. But feeing we are free agents, and weak, inflead of tempting
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=