Of Natural, Moral, and Civil Liberty. 6 ful. On the contrary, the fincerely virtuous S E R Nr. man only tatted], and experimentally know- Ili eth true rational liberty, for he hath a tually attained the end of it, which is felf- appro- bation. The good Author of our being hath endued us with this power, not to make us miferable, but to make us happy; and the frame of our nature, together with conftant experience, fheweth us what the happinefs is, which it is produétive of, namely, an inward tranquillity and felf -en- joyment, arifing from a confcioufnefs of our having freely chofen to do, what to our own underftanding appeared belt and fitteft to be done : Now virtue is neceffarily the ob- je ± of human approbation ; it is impoffible for any man who confìdereth it calmy and attentively, as fet in oppofition to moral evil, not to difcern an excellence and dignity in the one, and an infeparable turpitude in the other, and not to judge that the former is fitteft to be chofen by him, and the other to be avoided ; therefore the man who conftant- ly and uniformly pra &ifeth virtue with the full confent of his heart, enjoyeth an inward ferenity and felf- applaufe, which, the more he revieweth it, increafeth till the more; no jarring paffions difturb his quiet, no ting- ing remorfe breaketh the compofure of his foul,
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