and Decrees ofCod, &, 55i. They therefore that tell us, that fin is nothing, but a Privation) fpeak not facisfac1orily, nor altogether truly. Ic is no fubflance indeed ; nor any fuch Reality as Man cannot Caufe without Gods Caufing it ( fuppofing his Univerfal Natural Support and Concurfe.) But the thing forbidden is oftenAtis andDifpofitions as well asOmifÌians: and theform of fin, is a MoralRelation, which bath fo much reality as a Relation hath (if that be any). And that Relation hatha pofitive name; It is not only seeDr:iyatlisagainft tIse a meer Non-conformity , but alfo a Difconformity, becaufed founded in Lord Brooke ofthis, very Actual Golitions and Nolttions as forbidden , and not only in, Omif well. lions. 55z. Subtile OckamZed/. 3. q. 15. difputing tltrum regtitudo . de- f rmitas artsdifferent à fubftantiaalias ? denyeth it ; andafter a Confu- tation of the common Paying , that Deformitas eft carentia retlitudinis debite, di/finguitur ab Ala, quad in peccato Altus eft materiale , N carentia juffitin debite ineffe eft formale, concludeth, [9`ód deformitas non eft carentia juftitia vet reflitudinis debits ineffe attui, fed eft carers- tie rectitudinu debiti ineffe voluntati : .uqd non eft aliud dicere, nift quod voluntas obligator aliquem altum elicere fecundum praceptum Divi- num quern non elicit ; c} idea rec1itudo acaus non eft aliad gleam qui debuit elici fecundum ratan; rationem. ] But I conceive , r . That the rectitude of the will can be nothing elfe but the redlicude of its alts, flef- penftons and difpofitions ; 2. That Ockam here defcribeth only fins ofomif- fions, whereas the Rectitude of thewill is ofren alfo materially in not do- ing or willing what is forbidden. And with thefe two animadverfions I ám reconciled to Ockam: who addeth, [Ad aliad dico , Qgd illud di- llum de Materiali 6' Formal) eft falfum 5 9uia aut eft peccatam commif- fionis aut orni, onis : fiprima modo, eft Materiale fine formali : quia ibi non eft carentia reltitudinis, debits ineffe ac`íai: fifecundo modo, tune eft ibi carentiaqua eft formale fine materiali.] Refp. a. To the firft I add, that It had been true, if it had been the.eh.1 as an alt that had been for- bidden, or elfe the fpecies of the all as quidnaturale ; But it being the Art not as anall in genere, but as this all thus modified or fpecified by an undue object, that All with its Relation as quid phyficum are prefup- pofed as the relation to the moral relation of Pravity or Difconformity. And to the fecond I fay, that it's true that Omiffíon is not Materia Phyfi- ca but it is an inadequate firft conception of fin, and fo ismateria mo- raliter ditto vet loco materia. And the Omifon being confiderable , I..Quatentis Non-agere, a.. qua privatio naturalie, 3.2.áb Privatio 16. difconjormitas moralis, thefe three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the fins ofomiffion, 553. The fame Ockam 9uodl. a.qu.ao. Utrum aîtai exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel rnalitiam moralem ? even as dependent on the Will r And he denyeth it againft Scotus who affirmeth it: I will not trou- ble the Reader with their reafonings i not doubting but Ockamerred, and that it's true, r. That no exterior art is Morally good or evil primarily, 2.But that fecondarily and participatively as it is volùntary3 there is a morality in thealts. words, and deeds , and pafsions are under Law next to the will, and in dependance on it. As the body conjunct with thefoul is a fecondary part of the man, fo are our exterior arts of fin. 5 5k. The conceit that making fin a meer nothing , doch feem to jullifie God as not Caufing it, is a meer vanity. For, I. It juftifieth the finer more; who nomore is the Caufe ofnothing than God. a.Either man is able to no thatSomething or Ali which fin is the privation of .without any other Power than hehath, or not. If he be, then even the Aft`
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