76 Of Free-will. B. You fay well. Therefore remember, that our Liberty is no fur- ther good, than as it isa Liberty to goodand fromevil, * not from all de- * nogg peccare non pert;- termination : butthat thenearer we draw to neceffary love to God and nbt ad ration's; farmalem Liberi arbitrü : fed ponies goodneft, 'the betterweare. eft quadam irnperfettioar- A. 3. I further ails you, Dovenot neceffarily will altobonumfenfbile bitrzi creati , competen , iui, eo good fattam eft exfenfible good as fuch, with a fimple Volition ? and fo arenot at Liberty in nibilo : Alvar. ib.d.ii 5. that point ? p.470. Et bane rationem A. " What meanyou by aPimpleVolition? aßgnat S. Augeltintos,l.z. de viols & concup.c.28. B. That by which we will a thing byfimple complacence, confidered as éa 1. c z.de civit.Dei,c. t. im p l y good, before the underftandin tende Them.t.p.q.6z.art.8 $ compareit with any othergood, and ad 3. an quod Liberia can the Will to anEleslion. arb. diverts digest pof- A. " No doubt but we have an Appetite to fenfible good ; but whether it fit, fwat ordine finis, ot ad perfettio- tG be only the fenfitive Appetite, or always the rationalAppetite alfo ? Iam rum libertatie ejue ; fed as in fame doubt. Teed tdigat aliqued diver- B When f n f a perceiveth f weetne f t by tai or f mell > light ul- tende ab ordinefnis, quad e(t peccare, hoc yertinet chritudeby fight and fantafie, fenfual joy by internal fenfe, doubtlefs in ad defettnm libertetis. an Intelligent Creature, the Intellect prefently perceiveth fuo modo, Idem elicit de ver. q. 24. . art.3. ad 2. that there are fuchindeed as fenfe perceiveth, and allo that they are bona Voluntas ne/ira vere libe- finfibilia, and that bona fenfabiliaare verè bona in their proper order. And ra eft, comparatione voli- tionis out nolitionis, goam therefore as fenfible good isapprehended by the Intelle&, and made vo- elecit, quolibet memento, lible, fo the Will mutt needs have a complacency orfimple volitionof it non lotion quid prior maturequern fe determine- though it may refute itcomparatively. ret ad alteram partem, A. " Igrant itycu: Becaufe flakenotany fimple complacency to be a toterat feep¡am non deter- cc free a whatfoever : but onlycomparative Eleftions. minare adeandem partera, fed ad eppoftam : nec fo- B. It'strue, quoad fpecificationemmini, reel libertatem contrarietatis him vel áe/i(tetaG 000tenaone, But how prove you it true quoadexercitium a lus, vel libertatemcontra- goam product in inftanti diitionit ? May not the Will fufpendafimple complacency, ordifplicencya prafentis tampario : fed by not a&ing therein? etiam quia in inlìanti temporie ,quo elicit foam A. Not while theIntelleil apprehendeth the appetible good. operationem, veramretinet B, But becaufe theWill isprincipium exercitii, may it not firft rut-Pend petefiatem 'e: facultatem the a& of the Underftanding, by diverting it orb its own qua post earn neualicen, $> Y $ y fi valet, out etiamelit re, omiflion innot exciting it to cogitation? But,to be fhort, I grant you, tontrariaf operationem : that about fenfibleOb e&s fencemay neceflitatethe firttfimple a rehen- Alvar. difp. 116. p. 476. > Here is a power Polendi lion of the Intelle&, and thereby the firft fimple complacency the ándet. Buti,.eIs,itper Will maybeneceffitated? But, r. The comparing a&of the Intelle&. alias ? z. Hach he qui 2. Andthe veryfirfl apprehenftonof things altogether infenfble orfpiritual, non vutt , Potentiam ve- are fofar under thepower ofthe Will, that theWill may fufpend them. lindipro boo inftanti ? And fo theVVill hatha libertyof exercifi or contradiflion as they call it, as to its fimple complacency about things infenfible or fpiritual, fofar as it can fufpend the Intelle&s apprehenfion of their goodnefs (at leaf:.) Thearguments of Camero and others to thecontrary I know are confide- rable ; but I mutt not nowdigrefs toanfwer them. Queff. 4. But further, If the Intelle& perceive that there is but one means to a mansfelicity, and thatabfolutely neceflary, is it not neceflitated to will that means, by its neceffarywilling felicity it relf? A. " It it commonlyfoconcluded: But I am doubtful ofit. B. And well you may, without limitation. For, a. Felicity it felf isconfiderable either in the complex notion, or in the incomplex matter; I do not think that the firft is it that is neceffarily defired, but the latter; evengood it Pelf, asexittent or defired toexift : 2. And this goodthat is felicity is not neceffarilyknown by the Intelle& : One taketh it tobeffiri., tmal good, and another to be fen(ible good : One taketh it to be God, another tobe the Creature: Onefeeketh it hereafter, and another here. Therefore the fame man may be in doubt of this, bothas he doubteth of
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