OfSufficient and ffeaual Grace. C. " That is becaufe the Will is otherwife difpofedby fame contrary " ftronger habits : 4seither by thehabit of fenfuality, or thenatural incii- " nation to felicity alfach : which may bear down weaker particular habits " or inclinations. Nodoubt but the Will is qusdamnatura, and hath its natural in- clination togood and felicity, which is itsponder and radical difpofition to itsa&s; fromwhichevery a& is caufed that is done. But I fay not that ever it goeth contrary to thefe radical neceffitating inclinations to goodnefs. But de mediis it may bave inferior particular habits which it oft goeth againft. C. "That is becaufe the Underftanding conceiveth that another thing is " bef g andfo it is neceffitated by theVnderftanding. B. The Underftanding guideth, but cloth not neceffitate. That we Willrightly is caufed by the Underftanding ( as that I hit the way is by my eye-fight) but not that I exercife the A&it Pelf. Though we Willnot without oragainfi the Taft ftrongeft dictateof the practical Intelle& 5 yet I. Note that the Intelle&bathdivers perceptions atonce ( which is not commonlynoted ). It doth atonce at a deep fimple apprehenfion that e. g. bonum fenfible is pleafant, andgood, and amiable; and that bonnei fpirituale which cometh into competition, is yet better, may be at the fame time perceived, with fo low, dull andweak an apprehenfion, as thatthe Will may tenacioufly fo adhere to the firlt Pimple apprehenfion by a ftrong fimpleVolition, as that the fecond weak comparate appre- henfionmay not move ittoEle&ion. 2. For we find that it is not the objectivetruthof an apprehenfion which turneth the Will, without tome anfwerable clearnefs and livelinefs : And as a Preacher that dreamingly fpeaketh ofgreat things uncontroulably, but coldly, movethnot the hearers, fo is it with theIntelle& it Pelf. And 3. TheWill beingprin- eipium exercitii can hinder the Vnderfanding from perceiving truth, by hindering it from thinking ofthe evidence. 4. And-the Will it Pelf can fufpend its owna&, contrary to the underftandings,fluggifh di&ate. And not ailing when it can ( towardsGod; and true, goodnefs,) is the beginningof all the difordersof the Soul. C. "Butfaith Carnero, &c. the Will appetitus rationalis: And if " it att againfi reafon, it adethnot as a Will :Andfo alfo if it act without "reafon : Therefore it cannot forbid the Intellei tothink (by nolition)" " unlefs the Intellectfirftfay, Non cogitandumeft. Nor can it choofe but "velle cogitareif the Intellectfay cogitandum eft} Otherwife the Will were "a brnitidh, and not a rational appetite. B. t. The Will að by reafon , when it-cleaveth to that good whichis fimply apprehended by the Intelle&. ; The fimple apprehenfion goeth firlt ; e.g. [That this Fruit offered Eye is good and defirable] : Thisis true, and here the Willadhereth to it asgood. Then fhould the underftanding think comparatively ofagreater Good, and fay [This is evil as forbidden and as it hindereth a greater Good:] And this it per- formeth not, becaufe the Will is here the beginner of the Sin: not per- haps by a pofitive nolition or forbidding the Intelleít the comparing Thought; (for that it doth not without fhew ofreafon) but by neg-° le&ingoromitting toexcite the Underftanding ad exercitium g which it isbrought to in Adam and Eve, r. By diverfion, being before taken up with the Creature. 2. By voluntary negle& or floth. For the Will can omit its a&without reafon, andyet be a rational appetite. And the beginningof the Sinmay be this omiffionof theWill, or its over tena- cious adheringto fenfible good, apprehended truly by the Intelle&. 2. And we havenot fo much acquaintance with the faculties of our X own ?53
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