690 GOD'S GOODNESS VINDICATED. 4. God's decrees do cause no man's sin, (nor his damnation any further than as supposing sin ;) for Dr. Twisse himself still profess- eth, 1. That reprobation is an immanent act, and ' nihil ponit in objecto,' putteth nothing at all into the person. 2. And that rep- robation inferreth no necessity of sin or misery, but that whichis called ' necessitas consequentiæ,' and not any ' necessitas conse- quentis;''and Arminius and all confess that God's bare foreknowl- edge causeth or inferreth a ` necessitas consequentiæ,' which truly is but a logical necessity in order of argumentation, when one thing is proved by another; and not by physical necessity in order of causation, as one thing is caused by another. And. whereas they say, ' Then man might have frustrated God's decree,' I ask them whether man can frustrate God's foreknowl- edge ; suppose God to foreknow sinwithout decreeing it, (of which more anon,) is not this a good argument,' All that God foreknow- eth will certainly come to pass. But God foreknoweth, e. g. Judas's sin ; therefore it will certainly cornd to pass.' And what of all this ? It doth not come to pass, because God fore- knoweth it, any more than the sun will rise to-morrow, because you foreknow it. $ And if you say, that no power can frustrate God's foreknowl- edge, I answer, they are delusory words of one that knoweth not what he saith. For it is one thing to have power to make God ignorant, and another thing to have power to do otherwise than that which he foreknoweth you will do. No man bath power to make God ignorant ; but all sinners may have power to do other- wise than that which God foreknoweth they will do. For God doth not foreknow that, è. g. Gehazi shall not have power to for- bear a lie ; but only that he will not forbear it. Yea, more, God's foreknowledge doth prove that sinners have power to do other- wise ; for that which God foreknoweth will be. But God fore- knoweth that men will abuse their power to sin,,or will sin when they had power to do otherwise; therefore it will be so in the event. Now, if you will call their power to do otherwise a power to frustrate God's foreknowledge, you will but speak foolishly. For the power itself is foreknown ; and the object of knowledge ' in esse cognito,' is not after the act of knowledge. And if the person will not actually sin, God could not foreknow that he will, sin. So that foreknowledge is here (when it is not casual) but a medium in a syllogism,,and inferreth only the necessity of the consequence in arguing, and doth not cause the thing foreknown. Now, when Dr. Twisse, saith, that all the schoolmen agree, that no necessity, ` consequentis,'' or of causation, but Only ' consequen- tiæ,' doth follow the decree of reprobation, see how far he and
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