A Preface. it belongs to the Nature ofSubfance, that each ofits Attributes be conceiv'd by it fell, &c. Let us confider his Affertion, andhis Reafon for it. He determines, you fee, two really diflinrJ Attributes do not con- flitute twodivers Subliances. Youmutt not here take any other Mens Notion of an Attribute, according to which, there may be accidental Attributes, that, we arefore, would not infer diverfity of Subliances for their SubjeEts ; or, there may be alfo effential Ones, that only flow from the Effence of the thing to which they belong; to, too, no Bo- dy doubts one thing may have many Properties. But we mutt take his own notion ofan Attribute, according where- to it conflisutes, or (which is all one) is, that very EUnce. Now will not fuch Attributes as thefe, being really diftintt, make di- vers Subftances ? Surely what things are efentially divers, muff be conclud- ed tobe moil divers. But thefe Attri- butes are by himfelf fuppofed to be re- ally dif inc` , and to confiiture (which is to be) the Effence of the Subítance. And how is that one thing, or one Sub® ance, which heitb Many E ences .? I thQ
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