64. 1L DISPLAY of one, wherein he may be fffered to fin, or to do well at his pleafñre, as the fame authour intimates : ie feems then as to fin nothing is required for him to be able to do trod, bit God's permiffion ? no, for (a) the remonffrants, as theySpeak of them felves, do always fuppofe a free power of obeying, or not obeying, as well in thofe who do obey, as its tholé whodo not obey : that he that is obedient, may therefore be counted obedient, becaufe he obeyeth, when he could not obey.; and fo on the contrary. Where all the praifeof our obedience, whereby we are made to differ from others, is afcribed to our faces alone, and that free power that is in us: now this they mean, rot of any one aft of obedience, but of faith it fèlf, and the whole confummationthere- of (b) For if a manfb,old fay, that every man in theworld bath a power of believing ifhe will, and of attaining falvation, and that this power is fettled in his nature, what. argument have you to confute him, faith Arminiantriumphantly to Perkins? Where the fophiftical innovator, as plainly confounds grace andnature, as everdid ref ;su : that then, which theArminian claim there inbehalf oftheir free-will, is an abfolute independence on God's providence, in doing any thine, and ofhis grace, in doing that which is good. A felf-fiilñciency in all its operations, a plenary indifferency of doing what we will, this, or that, as being neither determined to the one, nor in- clined to the other, by anyover ruling influence from heaven ; fo, that the good alasof our wills haveno dependence on God's providence asthey are alas, nor on his grace, as they are good : but in both regards proceed from fuck a principle within us, as is no way moved by any fuperiour agent. Now the fiat of thefewe deny unto our wills, be- mire they are created, and the fècond becaufe they are corrupted ; their creation hin- ders them from doing any thingof themfelves, without the affißance ofGod's provi- dence, and their corruption, of doing any thing that is good without his grace ; a felf- füflìcieicy for operation, without the effefaual motion of almighty God, the feria caufe of all things, we can allow neither to men, nor angels, unlefs we intend to make them Gods : and a power of doing good equal unto that they have ofdoing evil, we múß not grant to manby nature, unlefswe will deny the fall of Adam, and fancyour Selves fill in paradife t but let us confider thefe things apart. r. I (hall not fond to decipher the nature ofhuman liberty, which perhaps would require a larger difcourfe, than my propofed method willbear it may fuffice, that according to my former intimation, we grant as large a freedom and dominion to our wills, over their own afas, as a creature fubjefa tothe fupreme rule ofGod's provi- dence is capable of; endued we are with filch a liberty ofwill, as is free from all out- ward compulfion, and inward necefity, having an elective fiscuity of applying it felt unto that which feems good unto it : in which it is a free choice, notwithßanding it is fubfervient to the decree of God, as I ahesoed before, chap. iv. molt free it is in all its ads, both in regard of the objeta it choofeth, and in regard of that vital power, and faculty, whereby it worketh, infallibly complying with God's providence, and working by virtue of the motion thereof; but furely to affert filch a fupreme independency, and everyway unbounded indifferency, as the Arminian, claim, whereby all other things requiite being prcfuppofed, it Ihould remain abfolutely in our own power, towill, or not to will, to do any thing, or not to do it, is plainly to deny that our wills are fubje& to the rule ofthe molihigh. It is granted, that in filcha chimerical fanciedconfidera- on of free will, wherein it is looked upon as having no relation to any adof God's, but only its creation, abfirnfaingfrom his decree, it maybe faid to have filcha liberty in regard of the objet ; but the truth is, this divided fenfe is plain nonfenfe, a meer fifaion of filch aneßate, wherein itnever was, nor ever canbe, fo long as men will con- fis any deitybut themfelves, to whofedeterminations they mull be fubjefe : until then more fignifrcant terms may be invented for this free power inour nature, which the f ripture never once vouchfafed to name, I fhall be content tocall it with Profper, (c) a fpoutaneous appetite of what feemeth good unto it ; freefrom all compulfions, but fubfeivieut to the providence of God. And againß its exaltation to this height of independency, I oppofe. (a) Semper R monlfrantes fupponunt Ifberainobcdiendi potentiam, & non obediendi r ut qui obedi- ens ell idcirco ohediens cenfeatnr, quia cum polfit nonobedire, o'oedit omen, & e contra, Rem. Apol. 7. 70. (0) Quad fi quis dicat omnes in nniverfum hemlines, hahere potentiam credendi fsve- lint, & Glntem confequendi : & hanc potentiam rife infirm hominnnr divinitus collatam, quo too argu- mento eum conftabis?. Armin. Antp. fat. 272. (e) L b. Arbis. eat ere fill paleita; fpanra- 'sta, appetitus, Profp. adCollor, ray. i. P 379. (t.) Every
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