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64.

1L

DISPLAY

of

one, wherein

he

may be

fffered

to

fin, or

to

do well at his pleafñre,

as

the

fame

authour intimates

:

ie

feems

then

as

to

fin

nothing

is

required for him to

be able

to do

trod,

bit

God's

permiffion

?

no, for (a)

the

remonffrants,

as

they

Speak

of

them

felves,

do

always fuppofe a free

power

of

obeying, or not obeying,

as

well in

thofe

who do

obey,

as

its

tholé whodo not

obey

:

that

he

that

is

obedient, may

therefore

be

counted

obedient, becaufe

he obeyeth,

when

he

could not obey.; and

fo

on

the contrary.

Where

all

the praife

of

our obedience, whereby we are made

to

differ from

others,

is

afcribed

to

our

faces alone,

and

that

free power

that

is in

us:

now

this they

mean,

rot

of

any one

aft

of

obedience,

but

of

faith

it

fèlf, and

the

whole confummation

there-

of

(b)

For

if

a man

fb,old fay, that

every man in theworld

bath a

power

of

believing

if

he

will, and

of

attaining falvation, and

that

this power

is

fettled

in

his

nature,

what.

argument have

you

to confute him, faith

Arminian

triumphantly to

Perkins?

Where the

fophiftical innovator,

as

plainly

confounds grace and

nature,

as

everdid

ref

;su

:

that

then,

which

the

Arminian claim

there

in

behalf

oftheir

free-will,

is

an

abfolute independence on God's providence,

in doing any

thine,

and

of

his grace,

in

doing

that

which

is

good. A felf-fiilñciency in all

its

operations,

a

plenary

indifferency

of

doing what we

will, this,

or

that,

as

being

neither determined to the

one,

nor

in-

clined

to the other,

by any

over ruling

influence

from heaven

;

fo,

that the

good alas

of

our wills have

no dependence

on God's providence

as

they are

alas, nor on his grace, as

they are good

:

but

in

both

regards proceed from fuck

a

principle within

us, as is no

way moved by any

fuperiour agent. Now

the fiat

of

thefe

we

deny unto our wills, be-

mire

they are created,

and

the

fècond becaufe

they are corrupted

;

their

creation hin-

ders them from doing

any

thing

of

themfelves, without the

affißance

of

God's provi-

dence, and

their

corruption,

of

doing any thing

that

is

good

without

his grace ; a felf-

füflìcieicy

for

operation, without the

effefaual

motion

of

almighty God, the

feria

caufe

of

all things, we

can allow

neither to

men, nor angels, unlefs

we

intend to make

them

Gods

:

and

a

power

of

doing good equal unto

that

they have of

doing

evil,

we

múß

not grant to

man

by nature,

unlefs

we will deny

the

fall

of

Adam, and fancy

our

Selves

fill

in

paradife

t

but let

us

confider

thefe things apart.

r.

I

(hall not

fond

to

decipher

the

nature

of

human

liberty, which perhaps

would

require

a

larger difcourfe, than my propofed method willbear it may

fuffice,

that

according to my former intimation,

we

grant

as

large

a

freedom and dominion to our

wills, over

their

own afas,

as a

creature

fubjefa

to

the

fupreme rule

of

God's provi-

dence

is

capable

of;

endued

we

are with

filch a

liberty

of

will,

as

is

free from all out-

ward compulfion, and inward necef

ity,

having an elective

fiscuity

of

applying

it

felt

unto

that

which

feems good

unto

it

:

in which it

is a

free choice,

notwithßanding

it is

fubfervient

to the

decree

of

God,

as

I

ahesoed

before,

chap.

iv.

molt

free

it

is in

all

its

ads, both

in

regard

of the

objeta

it choofeth,

and

in

regard

of

that

vital power, and

faculty, whereby it worketh,

infallibly complying with God's providence, and working

by virtue

of the

motion

thereof;

but furely to affert

filch a

fupreme independency, and

every

way unbounded indifferency,

as

the

Arminian,

claim, whereby all other things

requiite

being prcfuppofed,

it Ihould remain abfolutely

in

our

own

power, to

will, or

not to will, to do

any

thing, or not to do

it,

is

plainly

to deny

that

our wills are

fubje&

to the

rule

of

the molihigh. It

is

granted,

that

in

filch

a

chimerical fanciedconfidera-

on

of

free will, wherein

it

is

looked upon

as

having no relation

to

any

ad

of

God's,

but only its creation, abfirnfaingfrom his decree, it

maybe

faid

to

have filch

a

liberty

in regard

of

the

objet

;

but

the

truth

is,

this divided

fenfe is plain nonfenfe, a meer

fifaion

of

filch

an

eßate,

wherein itnever

was,

nor ever

can

be,

fo long as men will con

-

fis

any

deitybut

themfelves,

to

whofedeterminations

they mull

be fubjefe

:

until then

more

fignifrcant

terms may

be invented for

this

free power inour nature, which the

f

ripture never

once vouchfafed

to name,

I

fhall be

content

to

call it with

Profper,

(c)

a fpoutaneous

appetite

of

what feemeth

good unto

it

;

freefrom all

compulfions, but

fubfeivieut

to the providence

of

God.

And againß its exaltation

to

this height of

independency,

I

oppofe.

(a)

Semper R monlfrantes fupponunt Ifberainobcdiendi potentiam,

& non

obediendi

r

ut qui

obedi-

ens

ell

idcirco ohediens cenfeatnr, quia

cum polfit non

obedire, o'oedit

omen,

&

e contra,

Rem. Apol.

7.

70.

(0)

Quad

fi

quis

dicat

omnes in nniverfum

hemlines,

hahere potentiam credendi

fs

ve-

lint,

&

Glntem confequendi

: &

hanc potentiam rife

infirm

hominnnr divinitus collatam, quo too

argu-

mento

eum

conf

tabis?. Armin. Ant

p.

fat.

272.

(e) L b.

Arbis. eat

ere

fill

paleita; fpanra-

'sta,

appetitus,

Profp.

ad

Collor,

ray.

i.

P

379.

(t.)

Every