Serm. LXÍ. but upon themfelves, his In(truments ; in this fenfe it is far from God to tempt any Man ; and whenever in the ordinary couife, and by the common permiffion of his Pro- vidence; Men fall into temptation, the utmoft that God does, is to leave them to themfelves ; and he does not do this neither, but to thofe who have highly pro- voked him to depart from them, that is, to thofe who have juftly deferved to be fo dealt withal. And thus I have confider'd the Propofition which the Apoftle here rejeEts, namely, that Gad tempts Men, andhave (hewn as clearly as Ican, how it is tobe limitted and underftood. I now proceed to thefecond thing which I propound- ed to confider, viz. The manner in which the Apoftle rejeéts this Propofition, Let no Manfay, when he h tempted, I am tempted of God. By which manner of fpeaking, he infinuates two Things. Firfi, That Men are apt to lay their faults upon God. For when he fays, let no Man fayfo, he intimates thatMen were apt to fay thus ; and 'cis probable fomedid fay fa, to excufe themfelves for their deferring their Religion upon the temptati- on of Perfecution and fuffering. 'Tis not unlikely that Men might lay the fault upon God's Providence, which expofe them to thefe difficult trials, and thereby temptedthem to forfake their Religion. But however this be, we find it very natural to Men, to transfer their faults upon others. Men are naturally fenfible when they offend, and do contrary to their Duty s and the guilt of Sin is an heavy burthen, of which Men would be glad to eafe themfelves as much as they can ; and they think it is a miti- gation and excufe of their faults if they did not proceed only from themfelves, but from the violence and compulfion, the temptation and inftigationof others. But efpecially Men are very glad to lay their faults upon God, becaufe he is a full and fufficient excufe, nothing being to be blamed that comes from him. Thus Adam did, upon the commif hon of the very firft Sin that Mankind was guilty of. When God charged him for breaking of his Law, by eating of the fruit of the forbidden Tree, he endeavours to excufe himfelf by laying the fault obliquely uponGod ; The Woman whom thou gave/i to be with me, the gave tee of the Tree, and Idid eat. The Woman whom than gavell to be with me ; he does what he can to derive the fault upon God. And tho' this be very unrea- fonable, yet it teems it is very natural. Men would fain have the pleafure of committing Sin, but then they would be glad to remove as much of the trouble and guilt of it from themfelves as they can. Secondly, This manner of Speech, which the Apoftle here ufeth, doth infinuate further to us, that it is not only a falle, but an impious affertion to fay that God tempts Men toSin. He (peaks of it, not only as a thing unfit to be Paid, but fit to be rejeâed with the greateft indignation 5 let no Man fay, that is, far be it from us to affirm any thing fo impious and fo difbo- nourable to God. For nothing can be more contrary to the holy and righ- teous nature of God, and to thofe plain declarations which he bath made of himfelf, than to feduce Men to wickednefs ; and therefore no Man, that hath any regard to the honour of God, can entertain the leaft fufpicion of his ha- vingany hand in the Sins of Men, orgive heed to any Principles or Doltrines, from whence fo odious and abominable a Confequence may be drawn. I proceed to the Third Thing I propounded toconfider, viz. The Reafon or Argument which the Apoftle brings again(t this impious fuggeftion ; That God cannot be temp- ted with evil, and therefore no Man can imagine that he (hould tempt any Man to it , Let no Man fay, when he it tempted, I am tempted of God ; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any Man. And in fpeaking to this, I (hall Firfl, Confider the ftrength and force of this Argument ; And Secondly, TheNature and Kind of it. Firfi, The ftrength and force of this Argument, God cannot be tempted with evil, neither temptethhe any Man ; áaéi 516 '614 xaxwv, he is untemptable by K k k evil ; 433,
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=