Serm. CXXII. as difcover'd 6y Natureand 4 Revelation. 131 brought for the Soul's Immortality, are filch as no Man that is unprejudiced and hath a prudent regard to his own Intere(t can refill. Thus I have done with the Firfi thing I propounded to do for the proofofthe Soul's Immortality, which was to thew what Evidence of Re,afon there is for it. I (hall (peak briefly to the SecondThing I propounded, which was to thew how little can be laid again(t it, becaufe this will indire&ly give a ftrength and forceto the ArgumentsI have brought for ir. Fork is very confiderable in any Queftion or Controverfie, what ftrength there is in the Arguments on both fides : for tho very plaufible Arguments may be brought for a thing, yet if others as plaulible and fpecious may be urged againft it, this leaves the thing in 4equilibrio, it fets the ballanceeven, and inclines the judgment neither way ; nay, if the Objections againft a thing be confiderable, tho not fo flrong asthe Argumentsfor it, the confiderablenefs of the Obje&ions does fo far weaken the contraryArguments : but where the Arguments on one hand areftrong, and the Obje&ions on the contrary very flight, and fuch as may eafily be anfwered, the weaknefs of the Objectionscontributes to the ftrength, of the Argument for the other fide of the Queftion. To come then to the bufinefs, I know but three Obje&ions which have any co- lour againft this Principle. I.That the Notion ofaSpirit,oran Immaterial Subftance,does imply a Contradi&ion. Anf. r. This is only boldly faid,andnot the leaft colour ofproofoffer'd for it by the Author that afferts it. This Obje&ion had indeed been confiderable, ifit had beenmade out asclearly, as it is confidently affirmed. In the mean time I think we may take leave to deny, that theNotionofa Spirit hath any repugnancy in it, till forcebody think fit to prove it. 2. I told you that this Queftion about the Soul's Immortality fuppofeth the Exi- ftence of God to be already proved ; and if there be a God, and it be an effential property of the Divine Nature, that he is a Spirit, then there is fuch a thing as a Spirit and Immaterial Subtfance, and confequently the Notion of a Spirit hach no Contradi&ion in it; for if it had, there could be no fuch thing. H. It is faid, there is noexprefs Textfor the Soul'sImmortality in theOld Teftament. Anf. This doth not properly belong to the intrinfecal Arguments and Reafon of the thing, but is matter ofRevelation. And this I (half fully fpeak to, when I come to thewwhat Evidence the Jewshad for the Soul'sImmortality. In the mean time this maybe a fufficientanfwer to this Obje&ion, that there is no abfolute ñece(fity why it fhould be exprefly revealed in the Old Teftament, if it be, as I have (hewn, ana- tural Notionof our Minds: for the Scripture fuppofeth us to be Men, and to have an antecedent Notion of thofe Truths which are implanted in our Nature, and therefore chiefly defigns to teach us the way to that eternal Happinefs which we havea natural Notion and hopeof. The III. ObjeCtionis from the near and intimate Sympathy which isbetween theSoul and the Body, which appears in the vigor and ftrength of our Faculties; as Under- ftanding and Memorydo verymuch depend upon the temper and difpofition of the Body, and do ufuallydecay and decline with it. Anf. The utmoft that this Obje&ion lignifies, is, that there is an intimate Union and Conjun&ion between the Soul and Body, which is the caufe of the Sympathy whichwe find to be between them : but it does by no means prove, that they are one and the fame Effence. Now that there is filch an intimate Union and Connexion be- tween the Soul and Matter in all Creatures endowed withLife andSenfe, is acknow- ledged by all who affirm the Immateriality ofSouls ; tho the manner of this Union bealtogether unknown to us ; and fuppofingfuch an Union, it is but reafonable to imagine that there fhouldbe filch aSympathy, that the Body fhould be affe&ed with the delightsand ditlurbances ofthe Mind, and that the Soul fhould alto take part in the pleafures and painsof the Body, that by this means it may beeffe&wally excited and (lira up to provide for the fupplyofour bodilywants and neceffities : and from this Sympathy, it is eafie to give account how it comes to pats, that our Facultiesof Under(ìanding, and Memory, and Imagination, are more or lets vigorous, accor- ding to the good or bad temper and difpofition of our Bodies. For by the fame rea- fon that the Mind may be grieved and affii&edat thePains and Sufferingsof the Bo- dy, it may likewife be difordered and weakned in its Operations by the diftempers of the Body. So that thisObje&ion only proves the Soul to be united to the Bo- dy ; but not to be the fame thing with it. S 2 S ER-
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