4 EELS-LOVE AND VIRTUE NECONCTtiII.. be, and especially our obligations to practise them, stand in such a closeconnexion with the being and the will of God, as Gover- nor of the world, that if one could help it, they should not be even divided and separated in thought. But since these sort of suppositions are and will be made, I beg leave to examine, according to the best rules of my reason, how far this doctrine of eternal and unchangeable obligations to practise virtue may be supported ; and I will endeavour it in these following positions : SECT. II.There are Eternal Fitnesses in human Actions and in Divine. It is granted, there is an eternal fitness or unfitness of things in nature, or, if I might so express it, in our ideas of the natural world which do not depend on the will or appointment of God ; and these are perfectly unchangeable. " A globe is not fit to fill up the space of ahollow, cube ; nor is a triangle fit to fill up the area of a circle." Note, By the eternal fitness of things, we must understand the same as before I said con- cerning eternal truths, viz. that in themselves they are mere abstracted ideas, and can have no real, eternal existence but in the mind of God. Let it be observed also, that this eternal fitness of things does not require the actual existence of these things from eternity : If the mere ideas of these things have a necessary connexion together, they may be called eternal fitnesses, in the sense I have explained. I think there can re- main no reasonable doubt or contest upon this matter. The sup- position of a God, or no God, seems to make no alteration in these abstracted ideas. There seems also to be an eternal fitness or unfitness in the actions of single, rational and sensible beings. Note, Though we are here speaking chieflyof mankind, yet I call every rational being sensible, whether it be united to flesh or blood or no; be- cause it is conscious and perceptive of pleasure or pain, happi- ness or misery. I say therefore, it is fit that every rational being should preserve itself, at least so far as it may be made happy ; and it is unfit that it should destroy itself, or permit its own destruction. It is fit a rational being should seek its owir general, ultimate, or supreme happiness; and it is unfit that such a being should procure its own misery, or permit it, if he can avoid it. Nature, self-love, and reason, seem to dictate the same thing. This self-preservation and self -felicitation, are in- wrought in our natural constitution : and our rational powers confirm it. These may be called single or personal duties of * ] use the words o general, ultimate and supreme happiness,'" to distin.. guish it from any particular present pleasures, winch a man may and ought to deny or refuse by the mere rules of reason, when they stand incompetitionwith Isis general And ultimate happiness;
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