SECTION III. 7 by the fitness of things, to follow the rules of strict virtue con- stantly. But, on the other hand, self love and nature, with their strong sensibilities represented to him the constant and intense toil, the uneasy fatigue and pain of contradicting the dictates of his nature and his appetite of pleasure ; and that he never would have 'one easy day in the course of strict virtue. I-Iis reason balanced these things together, and finally resolved, that both his own rational. powers, and the fitness of things, required that Philedon should pursue his highest happiness, and that was to indulge his sensual inclinations in the highest degree; forthis wasthe ultimate happiness he could expect : And as soon as . he found diseases, or pains, or poverty come upon him, he might finish them all at once by a dagger, or by opium, and thus enter into eternal ease and indolence. Now in this case all his obligations to personal virtue, as well as to self-preservation, seem to be out-reasoned and overcome by the dictates of self- felicitation. And there are yet plainer instances ofsuch contradictions between single and social duties, viz. Famelico, a strong man, lies starving ; and he sees his weaker and hungry neighbour with only one piece of bread in his hand ; reason dictates that the strong man should not rob his neighbour of his property, es- pecially where this property is his very life : And yet reason, self-love and nature, join to dictate that Famelico should save his own life, and procure his own ease from the pain of hunger ; which he can do no otherwise but by taking away the bread, and perhaps life from his neighbour. Again, Naufragus is just drowning ; but he sees his neighbour supported by a little plank, which is just big enough to save one man's life ; reason and virtue dictate that, though he be stronger, he should not drown his neighbour, by taking away the plank : Yet his reason and nature seem to dictate also, that Naufragusshould save himself, though it be by taking the plank away from hisweaker neigh- bour, and leave him to be drowned. Yet again, reason dictates that Irus should pay what he has borrowed, and that at the pro- mised time ; and yet, perhaps, this payment takes away all his subsistence, and exposes him to extreme hunger and death ; and then both reason and nature at the same time dictate, that Irus should save himself from death, or secure himself from pinching hunger, whatever his neighbour loses or suffers. Or suppose, in a common shipwreck, a drowningman sees another near him, who has three or four such planks as would each of them save a life : Reason dictates he shouldpreserve his life, though it be by plundering his neighbour of one of them, if that neighbour refuse to lend or give it him : And yet reason seems to dictate too, that he should not take away his neigh- 'miles property by force. The 'same may be said concerning n3
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=