$ SELF-LOVE AND VIRTUE RECONCILÉD, loaves of bread, and a man who is starving. Many such cross. ing incidents as these may be supposed to happen ; and, in some of them it is not only very hard to determine which of these dic- tates should be obeyed, but it seems to me that these rules of reason may sometimes clash so much with each other, that they cannot be reconciled. Here, indeed, an objector may start up and say, What ! is this a possiblething that reason should contradict reason ? Are we of such an absurd composition, and are we placed in such a self-repugnant state by nature, that our supremepowers of direc- tion and action will contradict themselves, or that the fitness of things should stand on both sides ? I answer ; Yes, if we come into being by chance or by fate, without a God, then we may be such an absurd mixture, and situated in such a self-repugnant state ; and who can disprove it ; or who can help it ? Surely it can be no . wonder if so so absurd a principlè as fate or chance should produce absurd things. SECT. IV:The Existence of a God Reconciles these Contra- dictions. But let us wait and enquire a little, how these difficulties may be compromised by the supposition of the being of a God, and whether theycan be compromised without the supposition of . it. If there be a God, an almighty Maker and Ruler of man, that God by his will and authority, requires and obliges° man, in his general government ofthe world, to the same rules of sin- gle duty, and of social virtue, which are dictated by the fitness or unfitness of things. This will of God, made known to men, is his law; whether it be natural and written in the heart, or reveal- ed and written in a book. Thus man is obliged by his duty to God his Maker, as well as to himself, to secure his own being and happiness ; and he is obliged by duty to God as well as to his neighbour, to practice every social virtuet. s: Here it is granted, the word rr obligation' signifies an authoritative or suasive influence from the will, command or authorityof a superior, But if you enquire, why are we obliged by thewill or command of a superior? The fun- damental and ultimate reason is still, because the fitness of things dictates it, that we should obey a rightful superior. So that the ultimate ground of all obli- gation is still the dictate of reason concerning the fitness of things. But if you Will proceed further in your enquiries, wherein it appears that the fitness of things requires such obedience ? I answer, because such a superior can reward it, and punish the neglect of it, and therefore it is the interest as well as the duty of the inferior to obey; and this increases or doubles the fitness of such obedi- ence, as shall be shewn immediately. } It most be confessed, there have been some cases in scripturewherein God seems to have commanded men to act, in appearance, contrary to these eternal fitnesses, &c. in point of social virtue : As in the case of Abraham's offer- ing up his son, and the Israelites destroying the Canaanites. But we most distin guish between these two things, viz. there is God's common providence, or his general and ordinary rules of government, which he has made known to the reason of man, whereby Wan, considered as a sociable creature, is obliged is
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