CONFEttENCE íl. 413 ences of light from the merciful God, to lead his unhappy and bewildered creatures into the way of religion and happiness, by a discovery of the important truths and duties ofreligion to them with as much Or more reason than I can allow of divine influen- ces of power upon the hearts of men, to enable them to practise these duties : And, surely, if the influences of power seem in any case necessary, the influences of light or knowledge are much moreso : This was a happy thought of yours; Philander, and I give you my thanks for it. Sorts. I think, gentlemen, you yourselves plainly perceive, that this debate between you is brought nearly to an issue. There is no need of my resuming the case, or speaking any thingupon the subject. Loc. Yes, pray, Sophronius, let us have your thought* upon it, and perhaps they may introduce some further conversa- tion, to elucidate this argument yet more perfectly. Sopn. If I must give mysentiment in this matter, about the sufficiency of reason to persuade men to religion, and enforce upon them the practice of virtue, I must determine the point much after the same manner as I concluded the debate of yes- terday, about the sufficiency of reason to guide us into the arti- cles of religion ; and that shall be done in these fewpropositions : I. In natural, corporeal, and necessary agents, that cause or principle can only be properly called sufficient to produce the effect, which dotti and will actually and certainly produce it, where all other external things are found which are naturally necessary to this particular effect. So an acorn is said to be sufficient to produce an oak, when it is planted in a proper soil, and has the necessary outward advantages of rain, and sun, &c. So a clock is sufficient to shew the hours of the day, when all the weights, and wheels, and springs of movement, and mechanical parts of that engine are rightly formed and situated, adjusted and put in motion. But, in spiritual and voluntary, and moral agents, a causeor principle may be pronounced sufficient, in the nature of things, to produce the effect, where the effect is not actually produced, supposing that the motives are such as may and ought to influence the will, to produce the effect, Where- soever the obligations to duty are just and strong, and appear so to the attentive mind, and according to the rules ofreason ought to persuade thewill to chose the good and refuse the evil, there these obligationsmay be called sufficient naturally to reform the man, though the will may be led astray by a thousand other in- fluences, and may not once in ten thousand times be effectually persuaded to refuse the evil, and to chase thegood. II. Wheresoever the motives and obligations to religion, whicharise not only from the fitness of things, but also from the
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=