15 / 636
SECTION
III.
7
by
the
fitness of
things, to
follow
the rules
of strict virtue con-
stantly.
But,
on
the other hand,
self love and
nature,
with
their
strong
sensibilities
represented
to
him
the
constant and intense
toil,
the
uneasy
fatigue and
pain
of contradicting the
dictates
of
his
nature
and his appetite of
pleasure
;
and
that
he
never
would
have
'one
easy
day
in
the
course
of strict virtue.
I-Iis
reason balanced these things
together, and
finally
resolved,
that
both his own rational. powers,
and the
fitness
of
things,
required
that
Philedon
should
pursue
his
highest
happiness, and
that
was to
indulge
his
sensual inclinations
in
the highest
degree;
for
this wasthe
ultimate happiness he could expect
:
And
as soon
as
.
he
found diseases, or pains, or poverty
come upon
him,
he
might
finish them all
at
once
by a
dagger,
or
by opium,
and
thus enter
into
eternal
ease
and
indolence. Now
in
this
case
all
his obligations to
personal virtue,
as
well as
to
self
-
preservation,
seem to be
out
-
reasoned and overcome by
the
dictates
of
self-
felicitation.
And there
are yet plainer
instances
of
such
contradictions
between single and
social
duties,
viz.
Famelico, a strong man,
lies
starving
;
and he
sees his
weaker and
hungry neighbour with
only
one piece
of
bread
in his
hand
;
reason dictates
that the
strong
man should not rob his neighbour of
his
property, es-
pecially where this property
is his
very
life
:
And yet reason,
self
-love and
nature, join
to
dictate
that
Famelico
should save his
own
life,
and procure his
own ease
from the pain
of hunger
;
which he can
do no
otherwise
but
by
taking
away
the bread, and
perhaps
life
from his neighbour.
Again, Naufragus
is
just
drowning
;
but he
sees his
neighbour supported by a little
plank,
which
is
just
big enough to save
one
man's
life
;
reason
and
virtue
dictate
that, though
he be
stronger,
he should not
drown
his neighbour,
by
taking
away
the
plank
:
Yet
his reason
and
nature
seem to
dictate also,
that Naufragus
should save himself,
though it
be by
taking the
plank away
from his
weaker neigh-
bour,
and
leave him to be drowned.
Yet
again, reason dictates
that Irus
should pay
what
he
has borrowed, and
that at
the
pro-
mised time
;
and
yet,
perhaps, this payment takes
away
all
his
subsistence, and exposes
him to
extreme hunger
and death
;
and
then both reason
and nature at the
same time dictate,
that Irus
should save himself from death, or secure himself from
pinching
hunger, whatever
his neighbour
loses
or
suffers.
Or
suppose, in a common shipwreck,
a drowning
man
sees
another
near him,
who has
three
or four
such
planks
as
would
each of
them
save a
life
:
Reason dictates he should
preserve
his
life,
though it
be by
plundering
his
neighbour of
one
of
them,
if
that
neighbour refuse to lend or give it
him
:
And yet
reason
seems
to
dictate too,
that
he should not
take
away his
neigh-
'miles property
by force.
The
'same may be said
concerning
n3