Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.4

POSTSCRIPT TO THESE ESSAYS. SOME of the doctrines maintained in this book depend upon a right notion of imputed sin, or a translation ofguilt and punishment , from tine person to another, which I have explained at large in the second and thins essay: But there are some writers in the present age who have asserted, that as guilt is entirely personaland can never be transferred,so innocenceand punishment ore inconsistent ideas : and consequently no sin of Adam can be punished upon his posterity, nor can they be justly laid under misery for any sins of their father: Nor can the sins of any part of mankind be punished upon Jesus Christ the Mediator. These great and eminent writers the learned Grotius and Dr. Stillingfleet, in their Defences of the Satisfaction of Christ, sup- pose the actual desert of punishment to he personal and inseparable from the agent or actual sinner; but they suppose still that the guilt or obli- gation to punishment may be transferred from one person to another ; that is to say, sin may be imputed as to the punishment thereof to persons who did not actually commit that sin. I supposeall men will allow those authors were very well acquainted with the civil law, as well as with the light of na- ture, and the reason of things ; and I must acknowledge I fall in with their sentiments as most consistentwith reason and scripture. Butacertain learned and ingenious writer, whoopposes them in these sentiments, maintains, that " there is no such thing as an obligation to punishment, but what consists in a real desert of punishment ; nor is there any real guilt but what is per- seas' ; and that the punishmentof an innocent person, whether with or with- out his consent, is not only a violation of truth, but is a moral contra- diction, for he is no subject of punishment in any respect. No right can be in the universe to punish the innocent, unless there can be a right to violate truth and equity. To punish an innocent person, would be treating him directly contrary to what he is, which is as manifest a violation of truth as can well be conceived." 'Therefore some infer that he posterity of Adam can never be punished forhis sin, nor could our Saviour be punished for the sins of mankind *. Ile .grants - indeed, that the scripture uses these terms of °'Christ's bearingour sins, that he was wounded for our transgressions, and the iniquity ofus all was laid upon him," with many other expressions of the likenature : But these expressions, he says, are merely figurative, for strictly speaking, he could no more bear our punishment, than he could bear our iniquity, or becomesin for us, being both alike essentially repugnant in a literal sense to the truth and nature ófthings. Thus I have set this objection in the strangest light, and almost in the author's own words ; and yet I think it may be effec- tually answered in this manner : I. This ingenious author's assertions concerning " guilt, obligation to punishment, and translation of this obligation, and vicariouspunishment" of one for the sins of another, Lac, are plainly contrary to the common sense and practice of mankind, who often punish the crimes of parents on the children, and of offenders on their sureties. This is known more especially by those who are conversant with the civil law on these subjects ; I think thereforesuch assertionsought not to influence our assent, without most evident proof, any more than the assertionsofDr. Stillingfleetand Grotius, and many other wri- ters Upon this theme, who express themselves in direct contradiction to what See " An Essay on Redemption, being, the second Part of Divine Rectitude," page3-30 ; by Mr. John lialgdy.

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