Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.4

AN ESSAY 451 goes; but he is not free to act, for he bath not power to speak if he did chuse it; he is under a necessity to keep silence. Suppose Simon and Lepidus were locked up in prison with their friend Crato : Lepidus anises to go out, but can- not, and -is uneasy ; Simon chases to tarry there, and there he tarrieschearfully : They are equally free in their different choice and volition ; but both are under a necessity to act the same thing, viz. to abide in prison, one according to his choice, the other against it. IV. The liberty of the will is generally distinguished by writers on this subject, into a liberty of indifference or choice, and a liberty of spontaneity or voluntariness. Actions of the soul are said to be free with this spontaneous or voluntary free- dom, when the soul of man pursuesany object or performs any act, or chases any pleasure, without any consideration whether it can chose any other object, or perform the contrary action. This is a most large and extensive sense of the word liberty; for in this sense every act of the will is and must be free, for every act is spontaneous or voluntary ; and indeed this freedom of the will seems to be but a dilute idea, for it signifies scarce any thingmore than it is an act of the will. So we are saidwith the greatest freedom to do those actions to which we bave the strongest inclination, and wherein we take the greatest pleasure ; not considering or enquiring whether these actions are necessary or no : that consideration does not come into this notionof liberty. It is a common instance in this case, that all sensible beings with spontaneity and freedom pursuse what they Fall pleasure or happiness; yet they are generally said to du this by a sort of necessity too, because it belongs to their nature, And they cannot do otherwise. This is- attributed to brutes as well as men. And so the blessed above with perfect liberty love God ; yet so constantly, thatit appears-almost natural and neces- sary. So God with the strongest and most exalted freedom, And yet unchangeably and necessarily, loves himselfas the highest good, and pursues his own glory, as the noblest end. Every ne- cessary and immanent action that God Both with regard to Min- self, and many transient actions towards his creatures are perfectly spontaneous and free with an absolute libertyof this kind ; and yet perhaps he cannot dò otherwise, that is, his will natually and eternally and unchangeably determines itselfto these actions ; he freelyand necessarily consults himself in all his de- signs, and decrees and always acts agreeably to his own per- fections ; he is freely and necessarily . just and true to his creatures. I know some great writers distinguish here between a natural and a moral necessity, and call all those actions of the will which are really natural, as well as constant, certain and universal, such as acts of truth, and justice in God, morally

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