458 FREEDOM OF WILL. necessary andwill allow scarce any thing to be naturally-ne- cessary' but what pelongs to matter, or to the mere passive, or perceptive powers of a spirit: I grant indeed, that the will, which is influenced by rational motives, is not under such. a sort of influence in its actions as bodies are, because bodies are me- chanically moved ; yet thenecessity may be as strong and unal- terable: and if it be the very nature of God to act justlyand faithfijlly, so" that he cannot will, nor act otherwise, it may be called, I think, a natural necessity, since it springs from his nature ; as well as it may be called a moral one, because it is the action of an intelligent and free agent. Now let us enquire what is a liberty of choice or of indiffer- ence. "Though necessary actions are sometimes said to be free, when they are done thus spontaneously, as I have described, yet a liberty of choice or indifference in things not necessary is the more common sense in which the word liberty is used : This is the second branch of this fourth distinction, and this implies " a power to chuse or refuse*, to chase one thing or another among several things which are proposed, without any inward or out- ward restraint, force or constraining bias or influence." So I feel myself at liberty, and I chuse to stand or walk ; I am free and chose either to speak or keep silence, to point upward or downward ; I chuse one egg and refuse another out of two that are e,. Bred: Man is free whether he will chose to honour God his Maker, or dishonour him ; to do good to his neighbour, or do him hurt, to keep himself sober, or tomake himself drunk: In all these things he may chuse` or refuse Nvltich he pleases. This is what the schools call libertas indilfereíatiæ ad opposita, that is, -a liberty of indifference to chuse one thing, or its oppo- site. This liberty is utterly inconsistent with all necessity, whe- ther natural or forcible, that is, with all necessity of every kind : whatsoever is any way necessary, or imposed or constrained, cannotin this sense becalledfree. Whensoever the will is neces- sarily determined to any act or object by any thing without- or within itself, it has not a liberty of choice or indifference; for upon this supposition of its being necessarily determined to one Ming, it is evident that it could not chuse the contrary. V. In the last place, liberty or freedom of the will is either absolute and perfect, or imperfect and comparative. When we chuseor determine any thing without any manner áf constraint se Here note, I do not describe liberty of choice or indifference, as many bave done, by a power to act, or not to act, but a power to chuse or refuse i for there is a great deal of difference between a freedom of willing.or °busing, and a freedom of acting what we chuse, as I have shewn before, : and much darkness and confusion is brought in upon this subject of liberty, by not keeping this distinction clear. Perhaps that great map, Mr. Locan, had writ more..perspicu- ously on this subject, if he had always maintained this distinction, for /ta describes liberty, a power to act or not to act, &c..
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=