AN ESSAY. 481 verb, Quodvolumus facile credinaus, We easily believe that which we wish to be true: There is indeed a secret dishonesty and in- sincerity in this conduct, though we are notwilling to take notice of it. The will also has power to hasten and precipitate our fixed assent or dissent to propositions in the mind, and to hurry on the judgment to determine concerning the fitness or goodness of things upon a slight and insufficient view. The soul of man is soon tired and weary of suspense, and the will hastening to choice and action before due evidence, is really guilty of that rash judgment and rash action : For the will has power to with- hold the assent in many cases, and to delay the judgment where things do not appear to the mind with full' and bright evidenced and to set the mind upon searching further, and viewing the object again on all-sides, before it judges concerning its struth, fitness or goodness : And by this means the will may take care that the soul pass a juster judgment on things, after a fuller and longer survey of them. And even where things appear with a pretty good degree of evidence, the will is able to delay our assent, and withhold it for a season ; as for instance, if any learned and knowing friend stand by and warn us of danger and mistake, and bid ús take heed of assenting too,soon, lest we are imposed upon by false appearances, the will is able to prolong the delay of the judgment, and to withhold it from pronouncing upon the fitness or goodness of that object. Let it -be observed, that I do not alter our common forms of speech, nor attribute judgment to the will, though indeed it seems to be some determining operation of the soul, consequent to the appearances of ideas in ,the mind ; and therefore it is not merely what some great writers have represented it, viz. feeling what we feel, or hearing what we hear; for we can suspend and delayour assent or judgment, even when a good degree of evi- dence appears to the mind ; and we are also led sometimesto give a stronger or weaker assent, according to the inclinations of the will, or desires of the heart, neither of which can be pro- perly said with regard to feeling or hearing. I say again, I will not directly call judging an act of choice or voluntary operation; and yet there is so much of this kind of operation in the soul exerted about its passing a judgment on things, that I think we must agree that the will has a great deal to do in it : and there- fore the errors, derived from these wilful rash judgments, have something criminal in them, as well as they lead us into further criminal actions. And were not this the true account of things, I cannot see how faith or unbelief of the gospel could have any- thing in them worthy either of praise orblame : But this is only a hint by the way. Mr. Locke in bis Essay, book II. chapter 21. section 47. after some other representations of human liberty, which -seem
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