4652 FREEDOM OP WILL. not to be perfectly just, represents it to consist much in a powerof delaying the execution of our desires, or suspending the acts of volition or choice, until the man has diligently examined on all sides what is best : Now this no doubt is a very great part of human liberty ; and Des Cartes, the French philosopher, with good appearance of reason, makes this power of suspending the acts of the soul to extend to our assent to truth, as well as to the pursuit of good ; and therefore he proceeds so far, as to make judgment rather to belong to the will, and to bejustly laudable or blame worthy. Mr. Locke seems also to come pretty near to the opinion which I have proposed, as appears in the prosecution of this discourse of his about ourjudgments of good and evil, and our choice and practice consequent thereon ; on which:subject he hasmany excellent thoughts on morality. , SECT. ILWhat determines the Will to chuse or act. Let us now consider the human will in the common sense of it, as that power of the soul whereby we chuse or refuse what is proposedto the mind. The usual principles which are supposed by philosophers to be causes of the . determination of the will to act, in chusiing one thing, or in refusing another, are chiefly these three, viz. The greatest apparent good as it is discovered to the ritind, or the last dictate of the understanding, or the removal of some uneasiness. Let no consider these three particularly. First, thegreatest apparent good. This does not properly mean moral good or virtue, but natural good, or that which most conduces to our ease, pleasure or happiness. Now this greatest apparent natural good as it is discovered to the understanding, and consi- dered as the cause which certainly influences and determines the will, doth not differ really from the last assent or dictate of the understanding* considered in this same view of influence : for it is the last assent of the understanding concerning the apparent goodness of a thing which is supposed to determine the will to chuse it, andtherefore these two are really but one thing under different names or appearances ; and as such I shall consider them. Now among other evidences or proofs that the greatest apparent gooddoes not always determine the will to chuse or act, I shall mentionbutth'ese three : 1. If the greatest apparent good always and necessarily determines the will to chose it, then the will is never free with a liberty of choice or indifference ; for thingsplaced in such a cer- tain view, 'or seen in such a certain light, will necessarily appear to that individual understanding, And at that time in such a par- ticular manner, viz. as' fit or unfit, as good or evil, as a greater or The last assent of the understanding perhaps is a better tetra, because the last dictate seems to denote too much of action, whereas the understanding is represented properly as a passive posen
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