468 rarroOSI OF WILL. it was before ; 'Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoc- cupied land in an uninhabited country makes it his own posses- sion and property, and as suèh rejoices in it. Where thing* were indifferent before, the will finds nothing to make them more agreeable than they were, considered merely in themselves, be- sides the pleasure it feels arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have chosen, and purely because we chose them. liet us survey these two cases supposed in the second and third propositions a little more particularly: And, first, let us consider the case where some superior fitness or goodness doth appear to the un- derstanding. IV. If the thinking being or spirit be wise or perfect, then it will act. according to that eternal rule of action which rises from reason and the nature of things ; that is, whatsoever the understanding apprehends and judges to have a greater or superior fitness or goodness in it, the will being guided by the understanding, prefers and determines itself to chuse it,, and re- fuseth the things that appear less fit, as well as those which are unfit or evil. This it Both constantly and certainly, so far as the being is wise ; for this is one chief thing wherein consists the perfection or wisdom of a spirit, viz. to chose and prefer what appears to be fit and good above what is unfit or evil, and also to chuse that which is better or more fit, above that which has less fitness or goodness. V. 'Though the will of intelligent beings is generally and should be always led or influenced by the greatest fitness and goodness of things wheresoever it appears to the understanding, yet it is not necessarily and absolutely determined thereby : for the will of an unwise being may possibly determine itself with- out regard to the understanding, and even contrary to what the mind judges to be fit or good. And it may do this many ways; viz. 'by negligence, by sudden humour, caprice, or wantonness: The will through these influences may suddenly and rashly pre- fer evil to good, or that which is less fitto what is more fit. Or the will may be tempted and led away to chuse what is not really good, by the enticing and soliciting powers of strong appetite and passion, contrary to the judgment of the understanding. It is true indeed, the will may chuse and determine to resist those importunate passions, but it is true also that it may obey them without regarding the mind, or in opposition to the better die tates of the understanding : For though the mind is given us for a director or advises', yet not as an absolute lord or ruler. It is the will that is properly themoral principle or agent within us, the propersubject of virtue or vice, and therefore it must bea free and a self-determining power, and must chuse of itself, whe- ther it will follow reason or appetite, judgment or passion. And
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