470 vaEEDOM OP WILL, the mere imperfectionof our natural capacities, or under the in- fluence of any of these prejudices which we had no manner of means nor power to resist or subdue ; this mistake of judgment, and the unhappy choice of the will according to it, seem to be innocent, and merit no blame. But when we give upourselves to a rash determination of judgment or choice under such preju- dices as might be resisted, or when we yield to this impatience of the will, and wilfully neglect a further search where we might have justly delayed, and searched further, andby this means our will prefers real evil to good, or chuses things less fit before things which are more fit, we herein become culpable : And this faultiness hath greater or less degrees, according to the different opportunities, advantages and capacities we had to examine, judge and chuse aright. And let it be observed, that as unwise spirits determine amiss in their judgment and choice of things, through haste or rashness, or through a sadden and strong bias of appetite or pas- sion, 8'c. so a spirit which is wise may, throughunwatchfulness, suf- fer itself to be betrayed into such a rash and false judgment, and such an unhappy and criminal action, and chose evil instead of good. And perhaps this was the true 'springof the fall of man from his state cf innocence, and the entrance ofsin into the world, Hithertowe have spoken chiefly concerning the determination andchoice of the will in those cases where the understanding re- presents one thing as fitter and better than another : Bnt let us now consider the case supposed in the third proposition, where there is no such superior fitness or goodness, or where it Both it not appear to the understanding. VIII. There may be several things proposed to the under- standing evenofa wise and knowing, but imperfect spirit, where- in the superior fitness or unfitness is concealed, and cloth not suf- ficiently appear to the understanding, so as to give any just and certain direction to the will, which of them to chuse or refuse. In some cases it is plain that the understanding, after all proper surveys and enquiries, is left in perfect suspense about the greater or lesser fitness of things, and the will may be perfectly indiffer- ent to them : And yet the will may without fault or folly deter- mine itself to chase the one or the other ; as for instance, if I am hungry, and two pieces of bread, or two cakes lie before me, which appear tobe equally good for food, at equal distance fromme, and in all other circumstances have no discernable inequality, so that I am entirely indifferent to either of them in particular, yet any will may determine itself to chuse and eat one of them to satisfy my hunger: but which of the two I shall chuse must be determined by the mere act of my will, for I cannot stay an hour in suspense and trifling enquiries. Perhaps one of these pieces t bread might be really in itself much fitter for my nourishment
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