478 FREEDOM OF WILL. of choice left to man, or to any intelligent being in any action : but all is necessary With a natural necessity, all is fate ; for nothing can be otherwise than it is : And this opinion has given an unhappy occasion to the principles of the fatalists in all ages. III. This scheme of things supposes the truth of what we daily find in common life, that there are many objects and actions which are equal or indifferent to us, and which have no appear - ing superior fitness or goodness in them ; and yet it gives us leave to 'enjoy the pleasure of any of these indifferentobjects or actions by the free choice and self-determining power ofthe will. Where- as if the will must always be determined in its choice by some superior appearing goodness or fitness, we could never come to enjoy any of the satisfactions that may arise from these equal and indifferent actions or objects, becausewe should be held in ever- lasting suspense between them, as the ass in the problem between two like and equal thistles, and never be able to taste one of them, having Mottling that could determine our choice. IV. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the will sets the nature and distinction of virtue and vice in this present .state in the truest light, together with the rewardable or punish- able properties thereof: This spews how acceptable to God are the good actions of men, as being the effects offree choice ; the will having always a natural, free and self-determining power Of its own choice, evenafter things are represented to the under- standing in their fitnessor unfitness, in their good or evil appear- ances: And at the same time it lays the fault of every criminal action only npón the creature, by allowing the will to have ana- tural free power either to determine suddenly and rashly, and to precipitate the judgment concerning the fitness of things, and thus betray itself into a wrong choice, and by allowing it a free power also to suspend the judgment of the understanding in opposition to any slight appearances of fitness or goodness, and o search yet further, and wait for further evidence. This scheme alsofixes the guilt of evil actions entirely on the will of the crea- ture, by ascribing to the will a free power to determine itself, either to close or to refuse after any representations of good or evil, fitness or unfitness made by the understanding. This doc- trine therefore sets vice and virtue in their true natures, their merit or demerit, and represents them as suited to their different rewards. Whereas the other scheme, whichdetermines the will always and certainly by the understanding, and determines the under- standing by the situation and appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature and distinction of vice and virtue; for the sublimest virtues and the vilest of vices actually practised would rather be mattersof fate and necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the cifeumstances, and pre-
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