4S6 FREEDOM OP WILL. something extrinsical ? It is granted indeed, that the will some- times borrows a reason for its determination from varions occa- sions or arguments; Sometimes from very strongmotives, and the transcendently superiorfitnesses of things does butjust appear superior ; and somethnesitself determines its own choice between things in themselves indifferent, and where there is no superior fitness at all, or at least none that appears. Yet let it be again observed here, as I have intimated be- fore, that when two equal things are proposed to the will, there maybe a very sufficient reason why it should determine its choice in general some way or other, though there be no sufficient rea- son in the things themselves for determining in this way rather than that. There is very sufficient reason why a hungry man should eat, when two equal pieces of bread lie before him ; but he may chuse which piece he will eat, without any other reason than because he will. So there may be very sufficient reason why God should create a world ; but if you ask why he should create this sort of world rather than another, and this sort of creatures rather than others, which may be equally fit, he bor- rows the reason for it only front himself ; his own good pleasure is a sufficient reason : I3e Both it because he will ; nor is any other reason necessary besides his own self-determining power. It is supremely fit he should do what he pleases. Why must the will of God be such a passive power as is not able to act of and from itself ? Objection III. This doctrine of liberty represents the will of an intelligent beingas ä sort of blind power determining itself without reason in many instances, acting without any motive, chusing and preferring one thing to another without any ground of choice or preference; whereas in all intelligent beings, wile- ther God or man, there are no such blind principles of choice or action. Answer I. It is granted indeed, that this doctrine does not .ascribe understanding, or sight and perception to the will, for that would be to confound those two distinct powers or principles in a spirit : But this doctrine keeps those two powers of under - standing and will in their proper characters; the understanding seesor perceives truth and falsehood, fitness and unfitness, good and evil, as far as any such characters or qualities appear, and She will freely determines and chases after this perception, as it pleases. Generally indeed, and according to nature, the will receives direction for its own choice or determination from the perceptions of the understanding, where superior fitness or good- ness appears : In an unwise being it does not certainly and con- stantly so chuse and determine : In It wise and good being it al- ways chuses according to this appearing fitness. But where this superior fitness or goodness either is not, or does not appeär,
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