Watts - BX5200 .W3 1813 v.4

AN ESSAY. 489 freedom of indifference or absolute choice iú these his deter- minations. Objection V. Perhaps it will be objected here, that if two things are perfectly equal, and if the will of God or man deter- mines itself to chose one of them without a sufficient reason taken from the things, to determine it, then it is determined by mere chance or accident : Now it is very hard to suppose con- cerning any wise being, and especially concerning the all-wise God, that in any instance of action he is determined by chance. Answer. Chance is a word invented to signify the produc- tion of an effect in the corporeal world, whose cause we see not, and for which we cannot account ; then we say, it came by chance, as though there was no cause of it. Chances or acci- dents are such events as we see not the train of causes which produce them. But in the acts of thewill there is nothing can be ascribed to chance, for the will itself is the obvious cause of its own determinations. The word chance always means some- thing done without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other ; and consequently chance can never be properly applied to acts of the will, which is the spring of al-1 de- sign, and which designs to chosewhatsoever it (loth abuse, who O'erthere'be any superior fitness in the thing it chases or no ; and it designs to determine itself to one thingwhere two things perfectly equal are proposed, merely because it will. Nor can L think of any way to refute this doctrine which I have here pro- posed, unless we could prove that amongst all the infinite medi- ums whichmay appear to the human or the divine mind towards the attainment of any proposed end, there are no two mediums that are `equal, or which cannot he equally accommodated to their own purposes : And I think this is more than any man can prove. But this introduces the last objection. VI. If we may judge of things by the nicest observations that we can possibly make among all the beingswe know or con- verse with, there is no such thing in nature, nor ever was, as two things proposed to the will of God or man which are per fectly equal or indifferent, orwherein every circumstance was so entirely alike, that there is no reason for the will to incline to one side rather than , the other. There is no such thingas two leaves of a tree exactly alike; you may travel and search till your feet and your eyes ache, and never find them. Even in twograins of sand, or two drops of milk or water, microscopes will always sbew you some difference ; and therefore this doctrine of two or more things perfectly equal is founded upon a mere imaginary supposition, and the hypothesis that is built upon it cannot stand. Answer. What if there are no two leaves of trees, no tWo grains of sand, or drops of water or milk perfectly alike, be-

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