AN ESSAY. 495 if there be the least degree of inequality in any two or more objects, the divine wisdom beholds it, and finds out the supe- rior fitness, and is determined thereby ; And then probably there are but few things left whichhave such a perfect equality in them, as to be the objects offree choice : All the rest es mere fate. Answer. But to this I answer, That ifwe suppose no more than two different sorts of worlds to have had equal fitness in the divineview, before he chose to create one of them, together with the creatures and the inhabitants in them, then it follows that every creature and every circumstance of every creature in this one universe or world, which God has actually chosen and created, were all matters of indifference, and consequently were the object of his free choice : For though every creature in this universe, or the world which is now made, should be allowed to have a superior fitness with regard to the place it holds in this present universe, which is very improbable, and morethan can be proved, yet I think we must own that every individual part or creature of this world, together with this world itself, once stood in the view of God as a matter of mere indifference, and an object of free choice, since another sort of world might have been created, with all its different parts, creatures or.inhabitants. We might proceed furthur, and say the same concerning every single planet, and the creatures or inhabitants in it, and perhaps concerning every large spot of land, every mountain, every island, every sea and river in any of these planets, that they might have been altered as to some atoms or drops that com- pose them, though the other parts of that planetary world had been the same : And this reasonable supposition provides objects enough for the divine choice, and the freedom of thewill of God to exert itself. We might also descend to much minuter parts of thecreation, to every tree, and leaf, and flower, to every plant and animal, to every feather and hair of fowl and beast, as well as to the inanimate parts of any of' these globes : There does not seem to be an absolute necessity that every minute part, and pore and fibre of every species and of every individual should be precisely what they now are, even though the chief part of allowed in one thing why may it not in all ? Or if one or a few such instances in God's works do not infer fatality, why should many or all infer it ? Answer I. As we do not charge thedoctrine of fatality on men upon a supposition of some of the volitions or actions of men to be determined necessarily, since the rest and greatest part are free, no neither can fatality be charged on God, since the chief and largest part of his actions ad extra are free also, as sviti appear further in what fsllows : II. Whatsoever ideas or propositions, whatsoever eternal troths, or rules of virtuemay be necessary in the divine mind, yet there is not no much as the real existenceof one creature necessary, and no fatality is ut- terly excluded; since all created beings are contingent till the will of God de- termine them into existence. See difficulty I. preceding. See also the answer to the objection in this very page.
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