496 FREEDOM OF WILL. the form of each of them were the same as it is : And this will still provide new_objects for 'the choice of God, and his perfect liberty. Thus his actions of free choice in our world will be vastlymore numerous than those to which he is any way deter- mined by a superior fitness. Nay, every act of God and hisde- termination of anyor every circumstance relating to every crea- ture in the present universe, will be an act of his free choice or liberty of indifference, if we allow, as I said before, but twoge- neral schemes of a creable universe to have been equally fit: even though every particular part of each universe were suppo- sed to be necessary to its own whole, and therefore supremely fit in that particular universe, if language will allow such an ex- pression. This doctrine therefore is so far from fatality in every part of it, that it makes every creature or existent being in the present natural world the object of God's free choice. Difficulty II. According to this supposed scheme, that is, if one single thing be the only "fittest, and if God be determined necessarily to this one thing, then the free grace and goodness of God, and the special thankfulness of man for his benefits, seem to be much diminished, and in some measureprecluded : Vor in this view of things, God could not bestow one grain of favour more or less upon any creature than he hath done ; nor could he have chosen any other object for the exercise of his mercy and goodness, either among the varieties of the animal or intellectual creatures than what he has chosen. And would not this take away a great part of my obligation to thankfulness for any of his benefits, and in some measure cancel my obligations to thank him for his choice of me to be the object of them, if I must believe that God could not have withheld these benefits from me, .nor could have chosen any other object for those blessings winch he has made me partaker of, nor given me a grain less of any good thing which I enjoy relating to this life or another ? It is true, you will say, God has done me as much good as he could do, and therefore I am under the highest obligations to him : But let it be remembered also, if I may dare to express the consequence of this opinion; that he has made me as un- happy as he could make me, according to this scheme; and see whether this does not diminish or vacate a'great part of this obligation. Will not this destroy, or at least vastly abate the reasons of gratitude and love to God in those who receive his favours, when kings and slaves, rich men and beggars, strong men and crip- ples, creatures whose life is filled' with pain and poverty, or whose whole period of life is afft,uence and ease, were distin- guished only and necessarilyby the superior fitness of their ele- eumstauces ? What is there of free mercy in his disposal of be- nefits ? What can we find of mercy in the decree or providence
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