AN ESSAY. 497 of God, which distingtiishes the happy from the miserable ? What is it that raises them above the others, but that God was necessarily. determined to divide these distinct portions to them all by the superior fitness of things ? And have not Abraham the friend of God, David the King, Paul the apostle, Sir Isaac Newton the philosopher, Judas the traitor, Irus the cripple, Davus the slave, and Jack Adams the idiot, all equal reason of thankfnlness to the free bounty of their Maker, since so far as he acted in their composition of mind or body, or in their original circumstances of life, he determined each in such a particular manner, because his own will was thus necessarily determined, and therefore lie could not have done otherwise. III. If there be but one such superior fitness among all the ends and means which are in the comprehensive survey of God, and if God be under an unalterable necessity of determining according to this superior fitness, thence it will follow that every thing possible is necessary, and every thing that is not necessary is impossible. There is scarce anyreal difference between things necessary, and things possible, even in the view of God himself, according to this scheme of all things being determined by su- preme fitness. The difference is chiefly in our apprehension, by reason of our short- sight<d views of things, who cannotdiscover this superior fitness. But in reality, and in the sight of God, according to this hypothesis, nothing is possible to be done by God himself but what hath this superior fitness, and that is always necessary, and must be done. And according to this opinion also, what is not necessary is really impossible, and can never come into existence, because it has not this superior fitness. In this way of thinking, there neither is, nor ever was a medium between the necessity of what is future, and the impossibility of that which is not future, since there is but one fittest means or end, and is necessarily future ; but what is not fittest is for over impossible, and always wasso. Now does notthis appear strange and incredible doctrine ? I know it will be objected here, that this way of talking confounds metaphpical necessity with moral necessity, which are very distinct things. A metaphysical necessity, say some, is a necessity arising from the essence or nature of things, and takes place onlywhere the opposite implies a contradiction ; so all the semi -diameters of a circle are necessarily equal, because it is in- consistent in the nature of things they should be unequal. But a moral necessity is that whereby a most wise being is necessarily led to chuse that which is best, or to act that which is fittest. Now in this view there is a wide difference, say they, betwixt things necessary and possible, that is, things that are metaphy- sically possible wherein there is no inconsistence in the 'nature of things,_ and such are ten thousand essences which yet shall never VOL. Iv. .I j
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=