498 FREEDOM OF WILL. exist : And this is very different from a thing which is morally necessary, that is, which an all-wise Being wills and chuses out of ten thousand supposed possibles, because of its superior fit- ness, even though divine wisdomcannot chase otherwise. But to this I answer, That in philosophical strictness and the truth of things, this moral necessity and impossibility, and this metaphysical necessity and impossibilitywill appear to be very near a-kin : And though there may be some difference between these two necessaries, viz. moral and metaphysical, as to the immediate and proxime cause and reason of their necessity, yet the necessity of both of them is a physical or natural necessity, they are both equally strong and unalterable, and the original cause and reason why both of them are necessary, lies in the very nature of things. I might say the saine also concerning their impossibility As for exam- ple ; if the beingA cannot possibly exist because it carries in it some ideas or properties which are naturally inconsistent, so nei- ther can B possibly exist, because it doth not carry in it a supe- rior fitness ; since, according to this hypothesis, it is inconsistent with the nature of the all-wise God to make B exist, because it was not supremely fit ; and it is inconsistent in the nature of things that B should ever come into existence, because it wanted one property necessary to the possibility of its existing,' and that is- supreme fitness : Thus from the very nature of God, and from the nature of things, it is impossible that B should ever exist. And how much does this differ from a natural or physical impos- sibility? Hence it appears, according to this hypothesis, that it was true from eternity that every thing was naturally impossible which had not in its nature this superior fitness ; and if it had in its nature this superior fitness, then it was net only possible, but had a-sort of natural necessity to exist, which was the thing I undertook to prove, and which is the difficulty under which this opinion still seems to labour, notwithstanding theoffer- ed distinction. IV. Another difficulty that seems to bear hard upon this hypothesis, of all things being determined by superior fitness, is this, viz. Then there would be scarce any real difference between the moral and the positive laws of God. The one would be everywhit as necessary as the other, bc:h in themselves as laws, and with regard to God the law-giver: For if all the positive commands and institutions of God are given because he saw an antecedent fitness and goodness in them superior to any other commands that could be given at that time, and in those circum- stances ; and if all his moral commands are given upon the same reason, will it not follow that the positive laws are as necessary for that time and those circumstances as the moral laws are in alt times and circumstances ? I say, allowing this difference, that
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