DISSERTATION VII. ggg since God is pleased sometimes to represent his own knowledge and his agency by his wisdom or Word, and his Spirit, why may we not conceive two powers or faculties in the divine nature somewhat analogous to our mind and our will, though they are not the same, since the chief knowledge we can attain to of the blessed \rod is by analogy to our own souls. Here let it be noted, that when I represent the Word and Spirit by divine wisdom, and power, I do not conceive them merely as twonttributeA of the divine nature, as justice, good- ness, eternity, infinity, &c. but as such distinct faculties, or, perhaps, more distinct than the understanding and will are in human spirits, which two are called powers, rather titan proper- ties of the soul. I grant, that sometimes the terms attribute, property, power, may be used promiscuously for each other ; but when there is a distinction made between them, the terms property or attribute, are applied to any sort of modes or qualities, especially the essential ones, that belong to a subject : So immateriality, immor- tality, finiteness, changeableness, &e. are natural attributes of the human soul : Kindness, justice, faithfulness, &c. are moral attributes of a good man. But theterm power denotes a distinct principle of physical agency in the subject, whereby it is rendered capable of acting in this or that manner : So the understanding and the will, so the faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and the faculty of moving the body, are properly called the powers of the soul. In the same manner, by way of analogy, we may suppose infinity, eternity, unchangeableness, &c. to be the natural attri- butes of God ; goodness; justice, truth, are his moral attributes ; for none of these are properlyphysical principles, or capacities of action. But his Word, and his Spirit, seem to be repre- sented in scripture as the physical principles of knowing, willing, and efficiency, and therefore call them powers, because this sort of ideas seems to admit of a' greater distinction both in God and in creatures, than, those qualities which we usually call attri- butes or properties. The reader will pardon the necessary improprieQ, or un- suitableness, of some of these terms, when applied to the great and blessed God, since we are forced to borrow all our repre- sentations of divine things.from analogy to human ideas, and the terms of hamanlanguage. I proceed now to set this distinction of the divine persons in Justin Martyr, says, a God, or the Father, and the Wordhis Son, and the Holy Spirit rvaµ.iva (sir gala Suvwfaiv are, united as far as possible, for the Son is the mind, word, wisdom of the Father, and the Spirit is an emanation, as light from fire." Question 129. The primitive fathers do not always confine their language to 'such a philosophical 'niceness, but sometimes use those terms promiscuously, whereby they explain the Word and the Spirit.
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