CHAPTER II: sfb a vacuum or a pleñum, whether it be interspersed among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too hard to be disputed in this place what the nature Of it is : it has been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind, whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co- existent beings, whether it be the manner of our con- ception of the distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. There- fore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first essay among the Philosophical Essays, by L W. published 1733, Now, if we seclude space out of our consideration, there will remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that is, matter and mind ; or, as we otherwise call them, body and spirit ; at least we have no ideas of any other substances but these *. * Because men have different ideas and notions of substance,' I thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the margin. Some philosophers supposç'tbát our acquaintance with matter or mind reaches no farther than the mere.properties of them, and that there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the subject by which these properties of solid extension and of cogitation are supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist. Butperhaps this notion rises only from our turning the mere abstract- ed or logical notion of substance oraelf- subsisting into the notion of a distinct physical or natural being without any necessity. Solid extension seems to me to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies ; and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very substance of all spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent, almighty power ; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and unknown being, or abstracted substance entirely distinct from these, in order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mind, for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose ; therefore I rather think these are substances It most be confest when we say, spirit is a thinking substance, and matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine that extension and solidity are but mere modes and -properties of a certain substance or subject which supports them, and which we call body and that a power of thinking is But a' mere mode and property of some 'unknown substance' or subject which sup- ports its and which we call spirit : but 1 rather take this to be a mere mistake, Which we axe led into by the grammatical form and use of words ; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by substances and modes, as well as our grammati- cal way of talking by substantives and arljectioes, help to delude as into. the sup. postition. However, that I may not be wanting -to any of my readers, I would let them know Mr. Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age, and it is this : 'r That our idea of any particular substance is only -such a Maintains- s tion of simple ideas as represents that thing as subsisting by itself, in which e, the supposed or confused idea of substance (such as it is) is always ready to sa offer itself. It is a conjunction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their e, union, as makes the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their s union be unknown ; and our general idea pf substance arises front the self, sr subsistence -of this collection of ideas." Now, if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely as an unknown cause of the union óf properties, it ie much more easy to be admitted ; but if we proceed to support a sort of real, substantial, distinct being, different from solid quantity or extension in'bodies, and different from a power of think- ing in spirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needless scholasttcal nu- tion into the real nature of things, and then faaoying'it to have a réal existence.
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