® t LOOth, : oR THE RIGHT tin OF REASON Among substances some are called simple, some are com pound, whether the words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar sense. Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either spirits, which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a simple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded : elements are such substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced, into two or more substances of different kinds. The various sects of philosophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The peripateticks or followers of Aristotle made fire, air, earth and water, to be the four ele- ments of which all earthly things were compounded ; and they supposed the heavens to be a quintessence, or a fifth sort of body distinct from all these; but since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemists make spirits, salts, sulphur, water, and earth to be their five elements, because they can re- duce all terrestrial things to these five; this seems to come nearer the truth ; though they are not all agreed in this enumer- ation of elements. In short, our modern philosophersgenerally suppose matter or body to be one simple principle, or solid ex- tension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe; and therefore they make little use of the word element. Compound substances are made made up of two or more simple substances ; so every thing in this whole material crea- tion, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more dif-' ferent principles or substances, is a compound body in the philo- sophical sense. But if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances, which are generally esteemed uniform in their natures. So every herb is called a simple ; and every metal and mineral, though the chemist per- haps may find all his several elements in each of them. So a Mr. Locke in his Essay of Hum. Und. Book II. Chap. 22. § 2. seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which men have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the sup- port of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. Chap. 3. § 6. he seems to suppose there may be some such unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of matter and mind, namely, extension, solidity, and cogitation.; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation to that substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. if this he true, then spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal beings, or thinking bodies, which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But f leave these debates to the philosophers of the age, and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject.. See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays, before cited, Essay 4.
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