330 LOGIC : OR, THE RIGHT TJSL OF REASON. these ideas by sensation and reflection, they may be excited afresh by the use of names, words, signs, or by any thing else that has been connected with them in our thoughts ; for when two or more ideas have been associated together, whether it be by custom or accident, or design, the one presently brings the other to mind. III. Besides these two which we have named, there is a third sort of ideas, which are commonly called abstracted ideas, because though the original ground or oecasion of them may he sensation, or reflection, or both ; yet these ideas are framed by another act of the mind, which we usually call abstraction. Now the word abstraction signifies a withdrawing some parts of an idea from other parts of it, by which means such abstracted ideas are formed, as neither represent any thing corporeal or spiritual, that is, 'any thing peculiar or proper to mind or body. Now these are of two kinds. some of these abstracted ideas are the most absolute, ge- neral and universal conceptions of things considered in them- selves, without respect to others, such as entity or being, and not - being, essence, existence, act, power, substance, mode, acci- dent, &c, The other sort of abstracted idea is relative, as when we compare several things together, and consider merely the rela- tions of one thing to another, entirely dropping the subject of those relations, whether they be corporeal or spiritual; such are our ideas of cause, elect, likeness, unlikeness, subject, object,' identity, or sameness, and contrariety, order, and other things which are treated of in ontology. , Most of the terms of art, in several sciences may be ranked under this head of abstracted ideas, as noun, pronoun, verb, in grammar, and the several particles of speech, as wherefore,' therffore; when; how, although, howsoever, &c, so connections, transitions, similitudes, tropes, and their various forms in rhetoric. These abstracted ideas, whether absolute or relative, can- not so properly he said to derive their immediate complete and distinct original,-either from sensation, or reflection, (L) Because the nature and the actions both of body and spirit give us occasion to frame exactly the same ideas of essence, mode, cause, eject, likeness, contrariety, &e. Therefore these cannot be called either' sensible or spiritual ideas, for they are not exact representations either of'the peculiar qualities or actions of 'spirit or body : but seem to be a distinct kind of idea framed in the mind, to repre- sent our most general conceptions of things, or their relations to one another, without any regard to their natures, whether they be corporeal or spiritual. And, (2.) The same general ideas of cause, and effect, likeness, &c. may be transferred to a thousand
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