CHAPTER M. 33$ a book, are called universal ideas because they agree to all horses, men, or books. And I think it not amiss to intimate in this place, that these universal ideas are formed by that act of the mind which is called abstraction, that is, a withdrawing some part of an idea flour other parts of it: for when singular ideas are first let into the mind by sensation or reflection, then, in order to make them universal, we leave out, or drop all those peculiar and deter- minate characters, qualities, modes, or circumstances, which be- long merely to any particular individual being, and by which it differs from other beings; and we only contemplate those pro- perties of it, wherein it agrees with other beings. Though it must be confessed, that the name of abstracted ideas is sometimes attributed to universal ideas, both sensible or spiritual, yet this abstraction is not so great, as when we drop out of our idea every sensible or spiritual representation, and retain nothing but the most general and absolute conceptions of things, or their mere relations to one another, without any regard to their particular natures, whether 'they be sensible or spiritual. And it is.to this kind of conceptions, we more pro- perly give the name of abstracted ideas, as in the first section of this chapter. An universal idea is either general or special. A general idea is called by the schools a genus ; and it is< one common nature agreeing to several other common natures. So animal is a genus, because it agrees to a horse, lion, whale, butterfly, which are also commòn ideas ; so fish is a genus, because it agrees to trout, herring, crab, which are common natures also. A special idea is called by the schools a species : it is one common nature that agrees to several singular individual be- ings ; so horse, is a special idea, or a species, because it agrees to Bucephalus, Trott, and Snowball. City is a special idea, for it agrees to London, Paris, Bristol. Note, I. Some of these universals are genuses, if compared with less common natures ; and they are species, if compared with natures more common. So bird is a genus, if compared with eagle, sparrow, raven, which are also common natures: but it is a species, if compared with the more general nature, animal. The same may be said of fish, beast, &c. This sort of universal ideas, which may either be consi- dered as a genus, or a species, is called subaltern ; but the highest genus, which is never a species, is called the most ge- neral ; and the lowest species, which is never a genus, is called the most special. It may be observed here also, that, that general nature or property' wherein one thing agrees with most other things is
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