CHAPTER VI. $71 This distinction of the name or word is greatly necessary in argumentation or dispute ; when a fallacious argument is used, he that answers it distinguishes the several senses of some word or phrase in it, and spews in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is evidently false. SECT. IV. -Of the Definition of Things. AS there is much confusion introduced into our ideas, by the means of those words to which they are affixed, so the ming- ling our ideas with each other without caution, is a farther occa- sion whereby they become confused. A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage, and the vain notions of birth and quality, constantly joins and mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines these to be essential to her na- ture, and as it were necessary to her being : thence she is tempted to look upon menial servants, and the lowest rank of mankind, as another species of beings, quite distinct from' herself. A plow- boy, that has never travelled beyond his own village, and has seen nothing but thatched houses, and his parish church, is natu- rally led to imagine that thatch belongs to the very na- ture of a house, and that that must be a church which is built of stone; and especially if it has a spire upon it. A child, whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his schoolmaster very severe, easily believes that fondness always belongs to uncles, and that se-verity is essential to masters or instructors. Ho has seen also soldiers with red coats, or ministers with long black gowns, and therefore he persuades himself that these garbs are essential to the characters, and that lie is not a minister who has not a long black gown, nor can he be a soldier who is not dressed in red. It would be well if all such mistakes ended with childhood. It might be also subjoined, that our complex ideas become confused, not only by uniting or blending together more simple or single ideas than really belong to them, as in the instances just mentioned ; but obscurity and confusion sometimes come upon our ideas also, for want of uniting a sufficient number of single ideas to make the complex one : so if I conceive of a leopard only as a spotted beast, this does not distinguish it from a tyger or a lynx, nor from many dogs or horses, which are spot- ted too ; and therefore a leopard must have some more ideas added to complete and distinguish it. I grant that it is a large and free acqnaintance with the world, a watchful observation and diligent search into the nature of things, that must fully correct this kind of errors ; the rules of Logtc are not sufficient to do it ; but yet the rules of Logic may instruct us by what means to distinguish one thing from another, -and how to search and mark out, as far as may he the contents and limits of the nature of distinct beings, and thus may give us great assistance towards the remedy of these mistakes. A a 2
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