372 LOGIC Ott, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. As the definition of natives frees us from that confusionwhich words introduce, so the definition of' things will in some measure guard us against that confusion which mingled ideas have intro- duced : for as a definition of the name explains what any word means, so a definition of the thing explains what is the nature of that thing. In order to form a definition of any thing, we must put forth these three acts of the mind : First, Compare the thing to be defined with other things that are most like to itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees with them ; and this is called the general nature or genus in a definition : so if you would define what wine is, first compare it with other things like itself, as cyder, perry, &c. and you will find it agree essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of juice. Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary attri- bute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other things that are most like it; and that is its essential or speck difference ; so wine differs from cyder and perry, and all other juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may be called Its special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices. Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, (or which is all one) the genus -and the difference, and these make up a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressed from grapes, is the definition of wine. So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein it agrees with other things which are most like it,- namely, sum- mer, spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the year ; therefore a season of the year is the genus. Then I ob- serve wherein it differs from these, and that is in the shortness of the days ; for it is this which does primarily distinguish it from other seasons ; therefore this may be called its special na- lure, or its difference. Then by joining these together I make a definition. Winter is that season of' the year wherein the days are shortest. I confess indeed this is but a ruder definition of it, for to define it as an accurate astronomer, I must limit the days, hours and minutes. After the same manner, if we would explain or define what the picture of man is, we consider first the genus, or general nature of it, which is a representation ; and herein it agrees with many other things, as a statue, à shadow, a print, a verbal des- cription of a man, &c. Then we consider wherein it differs from these, and we find it differs from a verbal description in that it is a representation to the eye and not to the ear ; it differs from a statue, it that it is a representation upon a flat surface, and not in a solid figure ; it differs from a shadow, in that it is an abiding representation, and not a fleeting one; it differs from a. print or
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