CHAPTER VI. 3yg` one name : and that all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of species, can reach no farther than to make make mere no,hinal species ; and therefore our definition of things arehut mere nominal descriptions or definitions of the name, Now that we may do justice to this great author, we ought to consider that he confines this sort of discourse only to the essence of simple ideas, and to the essences of substances, as appears evident in the fourth and sixth chapters of his third book.; for he allows the names of mixed modes always to signify the real essences of their species, chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things to have real distinct species ; and that in the dis- tinction of their essences, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural, chap VI. sect. 40, 41. though it must be confessed, that he scarce makes any distinction between the definition of the name and the definition of the thing, as chap. IV. and sometimes the current of his discourse decries the knowledge of essences in such general terms, as may justly give occasion to mistake. . It must be granted, that the essence of most of our simple ideas, and the greatest part of particular natural substances, are much unknown to us ; and therefore the essential difference of sensible qualities and of the vatious kinds of bodies, (as I have said before) lie beyond the reach of our understandings ; we 'know not what makes the primary real inward distinctions be- tween red, green, sweet, sour, &c. between wood, iron, oil, stone, fire, water, flesh, clay, in their general natures, nor do we know what are the inward and prime distinctions between all the particular kinds or species in the vegetable, animal, mineral, metallic, or liquid world of. things. See Philosoph. Essays, Essay xi. sect. 1. But still there is a'very large field for the knowledge of the ,essences of things, and for the use of perfect definitions amongst our complex ideas, modal appearances and changes of nature, the works of art, the matters of science, and all the affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious life : and indeed it is of much more importance to all mankind, to have a better acquaintance with the works of art for their own livelihood and daily use, with the affairs of morality for their behaviour in this world, and with the matters of religion, that they may be prepared for the world to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition of the works of nature. If the particular essences of natural bodies are unknown to us, we may yet he good philosophers, good artists, good neighbours, good sutbjects and good christians without that knowledge, and we have just reason to be content. Now that the essences of some of the modal appearance and changes and natures, as well as things of art, science and
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