CHAPTER VI. , SECT. VII. Of a complete Conception of Things. HAVING dwelt so long upon the first rule to direct our conceptions, and given an account of the definition both of names and things, in order to gain clear and distinct ideas, we make haste now to the second rule to guide our conceptions, and that is, conceive of things completely in all their parts. All parts have a reference to some whole: now there is an old distinction which logical writers make of a whole : and its parts into four several kinds, and it may be proper just to men- tion them here. 1. There is a metaphysical whole, when the essence of a thing is said to consist of two parts, the genus and the diference, that is, the general and the special nature which being joined to- gether make up a definition. This has been the subject of the foregoing sections. 2. There is a mathematical whole, which is better called integral, when the several parts which go to make up the whole are really distinct from one another, and each of them may sub- sist apart. So the head, the limbs and the trunk, are the integ- ral parts of an animal body ; so units are the integral ,parts of any large number; so these discourses which I have written concerning perception, judgment, reasoning, and disposition, are the four integrai parts of Logic. This sort of parts goes to. make up the completeness of any subject, and this is the chief and most direct matter of our discourse in this section. 3. There is a physical or essential whole, which is usually made to signify and include only the two essential parts of man, body and soul but I think the sense of it may better be altered,, or at least enlarged, and so include all the essential modes attri- butes or properties, which are contained in the comprehension of an idea. This shall be the subject of discourse under the third rule to direct our conceptions. 4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an univer- sal; and the parts of it are all the particular ideas towhich this universal nature extends. So a genus is a whole, in respect of the several species which are its parts. So the species isa whole, and all the individuals are the parts of it. This shall be treated of in the fourth rule to guide our conceptions. At present we consider an idea as an integral whole, and our second rule directs us to contemplete it in all its parts : but this can only refer to complex ideas, for simple ideas have no parts. SECT. VIII. -Of Division, and the Rules of it. SINCE our minds are narrow in their capacity, and cannot survey the several parts of any complex being with one single 381
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTcyMjk=