412 LOGIC: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON. Yet some propositions may seem to contradict one another, though they may be both true, but in different senses, or respects, or times ; as, man was immortal in Paradise, and man was mortal in Paradise. But these two propositions must be referred to different times ; as, man before his fall was immortal, but at the fall he became mortal. So we may say now, man is mortal, or man is immortal, if we take these propositions in different respects ; as man is an immortal creature as to his soul, but mor- tal as to his body. A great variety of difficulties and seeming contradictions, both in holy scripture and other writings, may be solved and explained in this manner. The most important question on this subject is this, what is the criterion, or distinguishing mark of truth ? How shall we know when a proposition is really true or false ? There are so many disguises of truth in the world, so many false appearances of truth, that some sects have declared there is no possibility of distinguishing truth from falsehood ; and therefore they have abandoned all pretences to knowledge and maintain strenuously that nothing is to, be known. The first men of this humour made themselves famous in. Greece by the name of Sceptics, that is, seekers : they were also called Academics, borrowing their name from Academia, their school, or place of study. They taught that all things are uncertain, though they allowed that some are more probable than others. After these arose the sect of gPyrrhonics, so named from Pyrrho their master, who would not allow one proposition to be more probable than another ; but professed that all things were equally uncertain. Now all these men (as an ingenious author expresses it) were rather to be called a sect of liars than philosophers, and that censure is just for two reasons : (1.) Be- cause they determined concerning every proposition that it was uncertain, and believed that as a certain truth, while they pro- fessed there was nothing certain, and that nothing could be determined concerning truth or falsehood ; and thus their very doctrine gave itself the lie. (2.) Because they judged and acted as other men did in the common affairs of life ; they would neither run into fire nor water, though they professed ignorance and uncertainty, whether the one would burn, or the other drown them. There have been some in all ages who have too much affected this humour, who dispute against every thing, under pretence that truth has no certain mark to distinguish it. Let us therefore enquire what is the general criterion of truth ? And in order to this it is proper to consider what is the reason why we assent to those propositions which contain the most certain and indubitable truths ; such as these, the whole is greater than a part two and three make live.
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