CHAPTER II. 41; The only reason why we believe these propositions to be true, is because the ideas of the subjects and predicates appear with so much clearness and strength of evidence to agree to each other, that the mind cannot help discerning the agreement, and cannot doubt of the truth of them, but is constrained to judge them true. So when we compare the ideas of a circle and a triangle, or the ideas of an oyster, and a butterfly, we see such an evident disagreement between them, that we are sure that a butterfly is not an oyster ; nor is a triangle a circle. There is nothing but the evidence of the agreement or disagreement be., tween two ideas, that makes us affirm or deny the one or the other. Now it will follow from hence, that a clear and distinct per., ception, or full evidence of the agreement and disagreement of our ideas to one another or to things, is a certain criterion of truth: for since our minds are of such a make, that where the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we cannot withhold our assent; we should then be necessarily exposed to believe false- hood, if complete evidence should be found in any propositions that are not true. But surely the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would never oblige his creatures to be thus de- ceived ; and therefore he would never have constituted us of such a frame, as would render it naturally impossible to guard against error. Another consequence is naturally derived from the former ; and that is, that the only reason why we fall into mistake, is be- cause we are impatient to form a judgment of things before we have a clear and evident perception of their agreement or dis- agreement ; and if we will make haste to judge while our ideas are obscured or confused, or before we see whether they agree or disagree, we shall plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this subject in an Essay of the Freedom of Will in God and man ; published in t732. Section 1. page 13. Note, What is here asserted concerning the necessity of clear and distinct ideas, refers chiefly to propositions which we form ourselves by our own powers ; as for propositions which we de- rive from the testimony of others, they will be accounted for in Chap. IV. SECT. VILL Of certain and dubious Propositions of Know- ledge and Opinion. SINCE we have found that evidence is the great criterion, and the sure mark of truth ; this leads us directly to consider propositions according to their evidence ; and here we must take notice both of the different degrees of evidence, and the different kinds of it.
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