CHAPTER II. 415 When the evidence of any proposition is greater than the evidence of the Contrary, then it is a probable opinion ; where the evidence and arguments are stronger on the contrary side we call it improbable. But while the arguments on either side seem to be equally strong, and the evidence for and against any propo- sition appears equal to the mind, then, in common language we call it a doubtful matter. We also call it a dubious or doubtful proposition, when there are no arguments on either side, as next Christmas -day will be a very sharp frost. And in general, all those propositions are doubtful, wherein we cannot perceive sufficient marks or evidences of truth or falsehood. In such a case, the mind which is searching for truth ought to remain in a state of doubt or suspense, until superior evidence on one side or the other incline the balance of the judgment, and determine the probability or certainty to the one side. A great many propositions which we generally believe or disbelieve in human affairs, or in the sciences, have very various degrees of evidence, which yet arise not to complete certainty, either of truth or falsehood. Thus it cames to;passsthat there are such various and almost infinite degrees of probability and and improbability. To a weak probability we should give a weak assent ; and a stronger assent is due where the evidence is greater, and the matter more probable. If we proportion our assent in alhthings to the degrees of evidence, we do the utmost that human nature is capable of in a rational way to secure itself from error. SECT. IX. Of Sense, Consciousness, Intelligence, Reason, Faith, and Inspiration. AFTER we have considered the evidence of propositions in the various degrees of it, we come to survey the several kinds of evidence, or the different ways whereby truth is let into the mind, and which produce accordingly several kinds of knowledge. We shall distribute them into these six ; namely, sense, consci- ousness, intelligence, reason, faith, and inspiration; and then distinguish the propositions which are derived from them. L The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposition according to the dictates of any of our senses ; so we judge that grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound ; that fire burns wood, water is soft, and iron is hard ; for we have seen, heard or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of sense, that we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life ; and almost all the histories of mankind, that are written by eye or ear -wit- nesses, are built upon this principle. Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses of hear. ing, `seeing, feeling, tasting and smelling ; but that also which
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