CHAPTER YY. 4'Itl' Though persons' might be assured of their own inspiration, by some peculiar and inexpressible consciousness of this divine inspiration and evidence in their own spirits, yet it is hard to make out this inspiration to others, and to convince them of it, except by some antecedent or consequent prophecies or miracles, or some public appearances more than human. 'I'1We propositions which are attained by this sort of evidence are called inspired truths. This is divine revelation at first hand, and the dictates of God in an immediate manner, of which theological writers discourse at large : but since it belongs only to a few favourite, of heaven to be inspired, and not the bulk of mankind, it is not necessary to speak more of it in a treatise of Logic, which is designed for the general improvement of human reason. The various kinds of evidence upon which we believe any proposition, afford us these three remarks : I. The same proposition may be known to us by different kinds of evidence : that the whole is bigger than apart is known by our senses, and it is known by the self -evidence of the thing to our mind. That God created the heavens and the earth is known to us by reason, and is known also by divine testintonef or faith. II. Among those various kinds of evidence, some are generally stronger than others in their own nature, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward consciousness and intelli- gence, as well as divine faith and inspiration, usually carry much more force with them than sense or human faith, which are often fallible ; though there are instanceswherein human faith, sense, and reasoning, lay a foundation also for complete assurance, and leave no room for doubt. Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, or it would require us to suspend our judgment where there is want of evidence. But it is our sloth, precipitancy, sense, passion, and many other things, that lead our reason astray in this dege- nerate and imperfect state : hence it comes to pass that we are guilty of so many errors in reasoning, especially about divine things, because our reason either is busy to enquire, and re- solved to determine about matters that are above our present reach; or because we mingle many prejudice's and secret in- fluences of sense, fancy, passion, inclination, &c. with our ex- ercises of reason, and judge and determine- according to their irregular instances. Divine faith would never admit of any controversies or doubting's, if we were' but assured that God had spoken, and that we rightly understood his meaning. ad2
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