420 LOGIC : OR, TIlE RIGUT V9E Or REASON. III. The greatest evidence and certainty of any proposi- tion does not depend upon the variety of the ways or kinds of evidence, whereby it is known, but rather upon the strength and degree of evidence, and the clearness of that light in or by which it appears to the mind. For a proposition that is known only one way may be much more certain, and have stronger evidence than another that is supposed to be known many ways. There- fore these propositions, nothing has no properties; nothing can snake itself; which are known only by intelligence, are much surer and truer than this proposition, the rainbow has real and inherent colours in it ; or than this, the sun rolls round the earth ; though we seem to know both these last by our senses, and by the common testimony of our neighbours. So any pro- position that is clearly evident to our own consciousness or di- tine faith, is much more certain to us than a thousand others that have only the evidence of feeble and obscure sensations, of mere probable reasonings and doubtful arguments, or the witness of fallible men, or even though all these should join together. CHAP. III. Tite Springs of false Judgment, or the Doc- trine of Prejudices. INTRODUCTION. IN the end of the foregoing chapter, we have surveyed the several sorts of evidence on which we build our assent to pro- positions. These are indeed the general grounds upon which we form our judgments concerning things. What remains in this Second part of Logic, is to point out the several springs and causes of our mistakes in judging, and to lay down some rules by which we should conduct ourselves in passing a judgment on every thing that is proposed to us. I confess many things which will be mentioned in these fol- lowing chapters, might be as well referred to the Third Part of Logic, where we shall treat of reasoning and argument; for most of our false judgments seem to include a secret bad rea- soning in them : and while we shew the springs of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at the sane time discover which arguments are fallacious, which reasonings are weak, and which are just and strong. Yet since this is usually called a judging ill or judging well, I think we may without any impro- priety treat of it here ; and this will lay a surer foundation for all sorts of ratiocination and arguments. Rash judgments are called prejudices, and so are the springs of them. This word in common life signifies an ill opinion which we have conceived of some other person, or some injury
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