CHAPTER III. 421 done to him. But when we use the word in matters of science, it signifies a judgment that is formed concerning any person or thing before sufficient examination ; and generally we suppose it to mean a false judgment or mistake: at least it is an opinion taken up without sòlid reason for it, or an assent given to a proposition before we have just evidence of the truth of it; though the thing itself may happen to be true. Sometimes these rash judgments are called prepossessions; whereby is meant, that some particular opinion has possessed the mind, and engaged the assent,. without sufficient search or evi- dence of the truth of it. There is a vast variety of these prejudices' and preposseá- sions, which attend mankind in every age and condition of life ; they lay the foundations of many an error, and many an unhappy practice, both in the affairs of religion, and in our civil concern- ments, as well as in matters oflearning. It it necessary for a man who pursues truth to enquire into the springs of error, that as far as possible he may rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hourly against new ones. The number of them is so great, and they are so inter- woven with each other, as well as with the powers of human nature, that it is sometimes hard to distinguish them apart yet for method's sake we shall reduce them to these four gene- ral heads, namely, prejudices arising from things, or from words, from ourselves, or from other persons ; and after the des- cription of each prejudice, we shall propose one or more ways of curing it. SECT. I. Prejudices arising from Things. THE first sort of prejudices are those which arise from the things themselves about which we judge. But here let it be ob- served, that there is nothing in the nature of things that will ne- cessarily lead us into error, if we do but use our reason aright, and withhold our judgment till there appear sufficient evidence of truth. But since we are so unhappily prone to take advantage of every doubtful appearance and circumstance of things to form a wrong judgment, and plunge ourselves into mistake, therefore it is proper to consider what there is in the things themselves that may occasion our errors. I. The obscurity of some truths, and the difficulty of search- ing them out, is one occasion of rash and mistaken judgment. Some truths are difficult because they lie remote from the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain of argu- ment to come at them ; such are many of the deep things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theorems and problems of most parts of the mathematics. Many things also in natural philosophy are dark and. intricate upon this account, because n d 3
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