CHAPTER 1t1. ',1121 upon any subject we are too ready to run into his sentiments, being sweetly and insensibly drawn by the smoothness of his harangue, and the pathetic power of his language. Rhetoric will varnish every error, so that it shall appear in the dress of truth, and put such ornaments upon vice as to make it look like virtue : it is au art of wondrous mid extensive influence; it often con- ceals, obscures, or overwhelms the truth, and places sometimes a gross falsehood in it most alluring light. The decency of ac- tion, the music of the voice, the harmony of the periods, the beauty of the style, and all the engaging airs of the speaker, have often charmed the hearers into error, anal persuaded then to approve whatsoever is proposed in so agreeable a manner. A large assembly stands exposed at once to the power of these pre- judices, and imbibes they all. So Cicero and Demosthenes made the Romans and the Athenians believe almost whatsoever they pleased. The best defence against both of these dangers, is to learn the skill (as much as possible) ,pt separating our thoughts and ideas from words and phrases; to judge of the thins in their own natures, and in their natural and just relation to another, abstracted from the use of language ; and to maintain ,i steady and obstinate resolution to hearken to nothing but truth, in what- soever style or dress it appears. Then we shall hear a sermon of pious and just sentiments with esteem and reverence, though the preacher has but an un- polished style, and many defects in the manner of his delivery. Then we shall neglect aid disregard all the ilá.ttering insinuations whereby the orator Would make way for his own sentiments to take possession of our souls, if he has not solid and instructive Sense egnal to his language. Oratory is a happy talent whop it is rightly employed to excite the 1 asstous to ,the practice of virtue and piety ; but to speak properly, this art ,I. As nothing to do di the search after truth. Saar. 1II. Prejudices arising from ourselves. NEITHER words nor things would so often lead us astray from truth, if we had not within ourselves such springs of error as these that follow : I. Many errors are derived from our weakness of reason, and incapacity to judge of things in our infant state. These are called the prejudices of infancy. We frame early mistakes about the common objects which surround us, and the common affairs of life : we fancy the nurse is our best friend, because children receive from their nurses their food and other conveni- ences of life. We judge that books are very unpleasant thins, because perhaps, we have been driven to them by the scourge. We judge also that the sky touches the distant hills, because we cannot inform ourselves .better in childhood. We believe the
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